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THE ECONOMICS AND REGULATION OF NETWORK 
BRANDED PREPAID CARDS 
Todd J. Zywicki∗ 
Abstract 
One of the fastest growing sectors of the consumer payments 
marketplace is the general-purpose reloadable prepaid card sector. Their 
importance accelerated as a consequence of new regulations enacted in 
the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. This increased use of prepaid 
cards also increased angst among regulators, especially regarding the 
number and size of fees on prepaid cards. State and federal regulators as 
well as Congress are interested in imposing new regulations on prepaid 
cards. These calls for regulation, however, proceed in a largely fact-free 
environment. This Article describes the current economic and 
regulatory landscape for prepaid cards. The market appears robustly 
competitive—in recent years, costs declined, functionality increased, 
and major players such as American Express and several large banks 
entered the market. In addition, traditional consumer protection 
concerns appear to be largely absent, as there is no evidence that 
consumers systematically err in the cards that they choose. Absent a 
demonstrable competitive market failure or systematic consumer abuse, 
prescriptive regulation of the terms and substance of prepaid cards 
would likely have unintended consequences that would exceed benefits 
to consumers. On the other hand, there are some regulations that, if 
enacted, could promote competition and consumer welfare in this 
rapidly evolving market. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The general-purpose network branded prepaid card sector is one of 
the fastest growing segments of the consumer banking sector. While 
retail banking operations shrank in response to the 2008 financial crisis 
and the recession and regulatory responses that followed, the market for 
prepaid cards grew rapidly, in large part to fill the niche opened up by 
the retrenchment of the traditional retail banking sector. Moreover, 
although prepaid cards traditionally catered to low-income consumers, 
prepaid card usage is rapidly becoming mainstream, as reflected by the 
entry of retail financial stalwarts such as American Express, JPMorgan 
Chase, U.S. Bancorp, and BB&T.1 Prepaid cards are rapidly recognized 
as a mainstream consumer payment system, like debit and credit cards.2 
This Article will examine the economics and government regulation 
of network branded general-purpose reloadable prepaid (GPR) cards. 
Network branded prepaid cards are those processed by major payment 
network brands such as Visa, MasterCard, Discover, and American 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Gary Fields & Maya Jackson-Randall, Footnote to Financial Crisis: More People 
Shun the Bank, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 12, 2012, 2:54 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000 
872396390444443504577601283142758856. 
 2. A fourth front for payments is mobile banking. Although nascent at the time of 
writing this Article, it seems likely that mobile banking will grow in popularity over time, 
providing a simplified low-cost platform to combine electronic payment capabilities with some 
traditional banking services. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., CONSUMERS 
AND MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES 17–18 (2012). 
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Express, and accepted wherever those network brands are accepted, just 
like a debit or credit card. As such, network branded prepaid cards offer 
many of the same benefits as debit and credit cards: nearly ubiquitous 
acceptance, convenience, and the ability to make electronic payments 
easily, including online payments. Fundamentally, the products differ 
only in the time at which the consumer actually pays. As the name 
suggests, consumers load money onto a prepaid card before using it, 
whereas debit cards draw money at the time of use, and credit cards 
allow consumers to pay their bill after use. In appearance, prepaid cards 
are identical to debit and credit cards. Many consumers value this 
feature, especially lower-income consumers who often feel excluded 
from the financial mainstream. In essence, prepaid cards provide 
consumers with the same security, functionality, convenience, and 
mainstream respectability as those products. 
Prepaid cards are especially important for unbanked Americans as a 
mechanism for electronic payments and as an alternative to traditional 
bank accounts. Moreover, the number of unbanked consumers increased 
in recent years. A 2011 survey by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) found that there were approximately 10 million 
unbanked households in the United States (approximately 8.2% of all 
households),3 an increase from 9 million unbanked households (7.7% of 
all households) in 2009.4 Javelin Strategy and Research found that the 
percentage of consumers without a checking account increased by 50% 
(from 8% to 12% of the population) from 2010 to 2011.5 In addition, the 
FDIC found that approximately 24 million households (20.1% of U.S. 
households) were underbanked in 2011,6 an increase from 21 million 
households (17.9%) in 2009.7 Rates of unbanked or underbanked 
households are especially high among non-Asian minorities, lower-
                                                                                                                     
 3. FDIC, 2011 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED 
HOUSEHOLDS 4 (2012) [hereinafter FDIC, 2011 SURVEY], available at http://www.fdic.gov/ 
householdsurvey. 
 4. FDIC, 2009 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED 
HOUSEHOLDS 15 (2009) [hereinafter FDIC, 2009 SURVEY], available at http://www.fdic.gov/ 
householdsurvey/2009/index.html. The Federal Reserve’s 2008 Survey of Consumer Payment 
Choice reported that 6% of those in the study did not have bank accounts. See Scott Schuh & 
Joanna Stavins, How Consumers Pay: Adoption and Use of Payments 6 (Fed. Reserve Bank of 
Bos. Consumer Payments Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 12-2, 2011). 
 5. JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, PREPAID CARDS AND PRODUCTS IN 2012: ENABLING 
FINANCIAL ACCESS FOR UNDERBANKED AND GEN Y CONSUMERS 9 (2012). The percentage of 
consumers with a personal savings account also fell from 72% to 62% of the population. Id. at 8 fig.1. 
 6. FDIC, 2011 SURVEY, supra note 3, at 10.  
 7. FDIC, 2009 SURVEY, supra note 4, at 10. The FDIC survey defines an underbanked 
consumer as one who has a checking or savings account but also uses alternative financial 
services such as money orders, check cashers, payday lenders, rent-to-own stores, pawn shops, 
or tax refund anticipation loans. Id. 
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income households, younger households, and unemployed households.8 
The growth in the number of unbanked and underbanked consumers 
reflects in part the retrenchment of the retail banking industry in the 
wake of the financial crisis. But it is also the unintended consequence of 
several regulatory initiatives that increased the cost of bank accounts to 
consumers and reduced access to debit and credit cards.9 Price controls 
on debit card interchange fees, enacted as part of the Dodd-Frank 
financial reform legislation and new regulatory limits on overdraft 
protection, dramatically cut into banks’ bottom lines leading banks to 
impose fees and limits on once free checking accounts. Banks also 
tightened eligibility for free checking by either raising the mandatory 
minimum balance or tying free checking to usage of other bank 
products such as mortgages or car loans. According to a fall 2012 
Bankrate.com study, only 39% of banks offered free checking 
accounts,10 down from 45% in 2011, and down by almost half from 
76% in 2009.11 Similarly, a summer 2012 survey by MoneyRates.com 
found that the percentage of accounts with free checking fell to 35.3%, 
down from 38.8% a year earlier, and that in 2012, only 22% of the 
accounts at large banks (those with more than $25 billion in assets) 
were still free.12 Meanwhile, Bankrate.com’s 2012 survey found that the 
average monthly service charge on a non-interest-bearing checking 
account increased 25% from 2011, to $5.48 per month, and that the 
average minimum balance needed to avoid a monthly service fee rose 
by 23%, to $723.02 (with some accounts requiring an average minimum 
balance as high as $5,000).13 
In addition to raising fees, banks reduce costs by reducing services 
                                                                                                                     
 8. FDIC, 2011 SURVEY, supra note 3, at 5. 
 9. Claes Bell, ATM Fees March Upward in 2011, BANKRATE.COM (Sept. 26, 2011), 
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/checking/atm-fees-march-upward-in-2011.aspx; Claes Bell, 
Consumers Socked with Higher Overdraft Fees, BANKRATE.COM (Sept. 26, 2011), 
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/checking/consumers-socked-with-higher-overdraft-fees.aspx.  
 10. Claes Bell, Checking Fees Rise to Record Highs in 2012, BANKRATE.COM (Sept. 24, 
2012) [hereinafter Bell, Checking Fees Rise], http://www.bankrate.com/finance/checking/ 
checking-fees-record-highs-in-2012.aspx#slide=2. 
 11. Claes Bell, Abracadabra: Free Checking Disappears!, BANKRATE.COM (Sept. 26, 
2011), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/checking/abracadabra-free-checking-disappears.aspx. 
Fees for ATM withdrawals, overdrafts, and other bank fees have risen as well.  
 12. See Richard Barrington, Bank Fees Survey EOY 2012: Online Banks Resist Raising Fees, 
MONEYRATES.COM (Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.money-rates.com/research-center/bank-fees/; Becky 
Yerak, Checking, ATM Fees More Common, More Costly, CHI. TRIBUNE, Aug. 13, 2012,  
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-08-13/business/chi-checking-atm-fees-rise-in-amount-beco
me-more-common-20120813_1_atm-fees-fees-and-balance-requirements-credit-un ions. 
 13. Bell, Checking Fees Rise, supra note 10. The report notes that because 56% of banks 
offer fee waivers for signing up for direct deposit, there remain ways to preserve free checking 
for many. The required minimum balance for interest-bearing checking was $6,117.80. Id. 
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(such as by closing bank branches and laying off workers14) and 
shedding unprofitable customers. For example, Bank of America’s CEO 
stated that the bank will focus on the top 20% of its most profitable 
customers and get rid of the unprofitable ones.15 JPMorgan Chase 
estimated that new regulations on overdraft programs and price controls 
on debit card interchange fees made unprofitable 70% of customers 
with less than $100,000 in deposits, which required the bank to either 
raise fees, reduce costs and services, or shed unprofitable customers.16 
Just as access to banks shrank, credit cards became less available to 
many consumers as a result of the Credit CARD Act of 2009. The Act 
imposed new rules that directly restricted access to credit cards for 
consumers under the age of twenty-one and indirectly restricted access 
for many lower-income consumers. 
Prepaid cards are also becoming more mainstream for middle-class 
families. “Closed loop” prepaid cards, such as gift or reloadable cards 
that cardholders can use with only one merchant (such as Target, 
Starbucks, or Amazon.com) or with a group of related merchants (such 
as Old Navy, Gap, and Banana Republic), are a staple of middle-class 
shopping habits. General-purpose “open loop” prepaid cards are 
becoming more common as well. For example, some parents now 
provide their college-bound children with prepaid cards to access funds 
and make electronic payments without the danger of incurring credit 
card debt. Parents can conveniently reload the cards online and even 
monitor their children’s spending and budgeting habits.17 Prepaid cards 
also may prove useful for caregivers, such as a child’s nanny or an 
elderly parent’s home care provider. Rather than risk misuse or require 
a caretaker to account for usage after the fact, a family member can 
                                                                                                                     
 14. See Press Release, IBC Bank, IBC Announces Branch Closings in Response to New 
Banking Regulation, Stresses Commitment to Customer Service and Free Products Program 
(Sept. 22, 2011), https://www.ibc.com/en-us/Newsroom/Pages/IBCAnnouncesBranchClosings 
inResponsetoNewBankingRegulations,StressesCommitmenttoCustomerServiceandFreeProducts
Program.aspx; Susanna Kim, Bank of America’s Cost-Cutting Plans a Reflection of Banking 
Industry’s Woes, ABC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/bank-americas-
cost-cutting-reflects-banking-industrys-woes/story?id=17292528#.UGS9B41lTYg (noting plans 
by Bank of America to fire 16,000 employees and close approximately 378 branches). 
 15. Claes Bell, Prepaid Debit: Oasis for Unbanked?, BANKRATE.COM (Jan. 11, 2012) 
[hereinafter Bell, Prepaid Debit], http://www.bankrate.com/financing/banking/prepaid-debit-
oasis-for-unbanked/. 
 16. See Dan Fitzpatrick & David Enrich, Big Bank Weighs Fee Revamp, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 1, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020457140457725374223734718 
0.html. 
 17. In fact, prepaid card issuers developed special prepaid card products that target 
parents of college students by featuring built-in parental controls. See JAVELIN STRATEGY & 
RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 27 (describing prepaid card products marketed to parents that have 
parental control features and lower monthly and service fees). As noted, the Credit CARD Act 
of 2009 also restricted access to credit cards by college-aged students. 
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provide a caretaker with a prepaid card instead of cash, a credit card, or 
a debit card. Prepaid cards enable the caregiver to access funds with 
greater security and accountability. 
As usage of prepaid cards grows, so does regulatory scrutiny. In 
large part this scrutiny focuses on the fee structure of prepaid cards, 
which some critics complain is “unfair.” Yet, there is no evidence that 
prepaid cards are excessively expensive compared to relevant 
alternatives. There is also no evidence that prepaid card customers 
systematically fail to understand the fees and other costs of prepaid 
cards in comparison to the costs of relevant alternatives. Nor is there 
any other evidence of a competitive market failure (such as monopoly 
power) that supports immediate, intrusive government regulation. 
Instead, as the market grows, it appears robustly competitive with 
minimal barriers to entry and several major entrants. The largest barrier 
to competition—regulation itself, namely, the Durbin Amendment—
hampers entry by large financial institutions with truly competitive 
products. Available evidence, although limited, suggests that prepaid 
card customers largely understand the costs of prepaid cards as well as 
relevant alternatives—such as low-balance bank accounts, check 
cashers, and money orders—and choose among them rationally. Indeed, 
one source of the growth in prepaid cards’ popularity is the transparency 
and comprehensibility of their fees relative to those of bank accounts 
and credit cards. In addition, it appears that consumers generally act 
rationally in how they use their cards and in the plans they select, such 
as when deciding between either monthly fee plans on one hand or per-
transaction fee plans on the other. Indeed, as a testament to the 
competitiveness of the prepaid card market, even as the cost of bank 
accounts rose, the cost of prepaid cards fell substantially. 
The analysis and conclusions presented here are tentative and subject 
to revision. The prepaid card market is growing and evolving rapidly. 
The market experienced substantial changes in entry, innovation, and 
customer demographics in recent years. Moreover, there is little 
academic study of the market. The studies discussed here are of varying 
degrees of scientific validity and rigor. Many are funded or written 
either by industry or consumer activist organizations and thus may 
suffer from bias. This Article parses through these various studies, 
assesses their credibility, draws a coherent picture of the market today, 
and makes predictions about where the prepaid card market is headed. 
This Article begins by describing how prepaid cards work and how 
the industry is structured in comparison to debit and credit cards. Part II 
describes the regulatory framework for prepaid cards. Part III examines 
who uses prepaid cards and why. Part IV considers the arguments for 
regulatory intervention in the market. Part V provides concluding 
thoughts. 
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I.  PREPAID CARDS: INDUSTRY GROWTH, STRUCTURE, AND PRICING 
This section discusses the recent growth in the prepaid card industry 
and explains how prepaid cards are structured and priced. 
A.  Prepaid Card Industry Growth 
Prepaid cards come in many different forms. They may serve a one-
time use or establish long-term relationships, remain anonymous or 
imprint consumer names, hold pre-denominated or fixed amounts, or 
retain a loaded value as requested by the consumer.18 More generally, 
prepaid cards are distinguished as “closed loop” or “open loop” cards. 
Closed loop cards include store cards that cardholders can use only with 
either the designated merchant or a group of affiliated merchants. Open 
loop cards include payroll cards and general-purpose cards that 
cardholders can use anywhere the network brand is accepted, just like a 
credit or debit card.19 
Although prepaid cards today account for only a small percentage of 
all payments, recent studies indicate a growing consumer adoption rate 
for reloadable prepaid cards.20 According to the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, the 2011 transaction volume was $2.141 trillion for 
credit cards, $2.053 trillion for debit cards, and $57 billion for prepaid 
cards.21 Between 2006 and 2009, however, prepaid cards were the 
fastest growing segment of noncash payments, growing 21.5% per year 
in volume and 22.9% in number of charges. In comparison, debit card 
annual growth in volume was 14.8% and credit card volume declined 
0.2%.22 Meanwhile, the year-to-year annual percentage growth of 
dollars loaded on prepaid cards rose 40% or more each year since 
2008.23 Although prepaid card use declined slightly from 2008 to 2009, 
debit and credit card use declined more dramatically. Prepaid card 
transactions increased as a percentage of electronic transactions during 
                                                                                                                     
 18. CAROL R. VAN CLEEF ET AL., EMERGING TRENDS IN STORED VALUE AND PREPAID CARDS 3 
(Bryan Cave ed. 2005), available at http://www.mtraweb.org/conferences/2005/VanCleef-MTRA-
Emerging_Trends_v3.pdf.  
 19. Id. at 4. 
 20. BRETTON WOODS, INC., ANALYSIS OF RELOADABLE PREPAID CARDS IN AN 
ENVIRONMENT OF RISING CONSUMER BANKING FEES 15 (2011), available at http://bretton-
woods.com/media/51f57d9869e66aa1ffff8159ffffd502.pdf. 
 21. What’s the Deal with Prepaid Cards? How General Purpose Reloadable Cards (GPR) Are 
Growing and What’s Next, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
notice%20-and-comment/whats-the-deal%20-with-prepaid-cards/ (last visited June 3, 2013) 
[hereinafter What’s the Deal with Prepaid Cards?]. 
 22. FED. RESERVE BANK SERVS., THE 2010 FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY: 
NONCASH PAYMENT TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: 2006–2009, at 17 (2011), available at 
http://www.frbservices.org/files/communications/pdf/press/2010_payments_study.pdf. 
 23. What’s the Deal with Prepaid Cards?, supra note 21. 
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that period.24 Since 2009, prepaid card usage grew dramatically. Some 
estimate that by 2014 the total annual volume loaded onto general-
purpose reloadable (GPR) prepaid cards will reach $167 billion, up 
from just $12 billion in 2007.25 
According to Javelin Strategy and Research, from 2010 to 2011 
debit card ownership fell 12 percentage points (from 78% to 66% of 
consumers), credit card ownership fell 7 percentage points (from 74% to 
67%), checking account ownership dropped 4 percentage points (from 
92% to 88%), and personal savings account ownership fell 10 
percentage points (from 72% to 62% of consumers).26 Javelin found that 
the only major consumer financial product to grow in ownership during 
that period was prepaid cards. During that time, consumer use of 
prepaid cards rose by two percentage points to 13%.27 This substitution 
reflects both the growing attractiveness and reduced cost of prepaid 
cards, and the increased cost and reduced availability of debit and credit 
cards that resulted from recently enacted regulation. 
As prepaid card usage grows, its user base is broadening as well.28 
According to a study by the Payment Cards Center of the Philadelphia 
Federal Reserve, consumer usage of prepaid cards generally follows a 
“U-shaped” pattern of distribution. Many consumers use GPR cards 
infrequently and for only a short amount of time before discarding 
them, while others use prepaid cards heavily and repeatedly, apparently 
as a substitute for a traditional checking account.29 On average, a card is 
active for six months before a cardholder discards it, but this metric 
shows variation by retail channel.30 Cards purchased at retail outlets are 
typically active for only two months, payroll cards are active for four 
months, and GPR cards marketed through a website or a financial 
institution remain active for about six months.31 Most cards distributed 
through retailers are used for five or fewer purchases, and only 11% are 
used more than fifty times. Cards marketed through web distributors are 
used more heavily.32 According to the Philadelphia Federal Reserve 
study, more than a quarter of GPR cards are used for fifty or more 
                                                                                                                     
 24. See Kevin Foster et al., The 2009 Survey of Consumer Payment Choice 17 (Fed. 
Reserve Bank of Bos., Public Policy Discussion Paper No. 11-1, 2011). 
 25. See Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 77 Fed. Reg. 30923 (proposed May 24, 
2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1005) (citing report by Mercator Advisory Group). 
 26. JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 8 fig.1. 
 27. Id.  
 28. Bell, Prepaid Debit, supra note 15. 
 29. See Stephanie M. Wilshusen et al., Consumers’ Use of Prepaid Cards: A Transaction-
Based Analysis 20 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Payment Cards Discussion Paper, 2012). 
 30. Id. at 18. 
 31. Id. at 18–19. 
 32. Id. at 20. 
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purchase transactions.33 Purchase volumes are similarly varied by 
distribution channel, as 37% of cards distributed through the Internet 
have purchase volumes of more than $1,000 compared to less than 20% 
of those distributed through retailers.34 Those who acquire cards via the 
Internet typically reload the cards many more times than those who 
acquire them from retailers.35 
Cardholders can typically use prepaid cards to make purchases with 
either a signature or personal identification number (PIN), by 
withdrawing cash at automated teller machines (ATMs), or by 
requesting cash back with purchases at grocery stores and drug stores. 
Consumers can check their balances online, over the phone, or at an 
ATM.36 Prepaid cards also generally offer deposit insurance and fraud 
protection if consumers follow certain procedures.37 In addition, 
cardholders can use prepaid cards to pay bills online, to remit funds to 
foreign countries, to get cash back with purchases at grocery stores and 
drug stores, and to acquire courtesy checks. Some cards also enable the 
consumer to use the card like a savings account—some offer interest 
rates higher than prevailing bank rates.38 Some prepaid card customers 
express a desire for more cards that offer savings, direct deposit, and 
credit building features.39 Others, on the other hand, prefer prepaid 
cards to credit or debit cards because of prepaid cards’ anonymity, the 
fact that prepaid cards are not integrated into a credit reporting system, 
and because they can obtain prepaid cards without an in-depth 
identification or credit check.40 
Overall, prepaid card users appear satisfied with the product. 
According to a National Urban League survey focused on African- 
American consumers, 67% of current reloadable prepaid card owners 
rate their perception of the cards as either positive or very positive 
                                                                                                                     
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 21. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Checking one’s balance online via text message or via automated phone service is 
usually free, but doing so by live operator or through an ATM usually incurs a fee. 
 37. There is some uncertainty, however, as to how extensive and uniform these 
protections are. See discussion infra notes 255–60 and accompanying text. 
 38. For example, NetSpend developed a program that allows consumers to have a linked 
interest-bearing savings account and to transfer funds from the savings account to the card to 
make payments. See Sarah Gordon, Jennifer Romich & Eric Waithaka, A Tool for Getting By or 
Getting Ahead? Consumers’ Views on Prepaid Cards 15–16 (Ctr. for Fin. Servs. Innovation, 
Working Paper No. 9, 2009). News reports indicate that this savings feature is popular with 
NetSpend’s customers. See Fields & Jackson-Randall, supra note 1. 
 39. See PEW HEALTH GRP., KEY FOCUS GROUP FINDINGS ON PREPAID DEBIT CARDS 3 (2011), 
available at http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2012/FSP_12014%20Pew%20Debit 
Cards_R10A-4-5-12.pdf. 
 40. Id. at 5. 
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overall, and only 7% have a negative opinion.41 Even among former 
users of prepaid cards, only 15% had a negative opinion.42 Research by 
the Aite Group also found very high levels of satisfaction with prepaid 
cards—73% of those surveyed responded that they were “very” or 
“extremely” satisfied.43 
B.  Industry Structure: How Prepaid Cards Work 
The prepaid card network operates similarly to other types of 
electronic payment systems but with a few differences.44 The backbone 
of the system is the card payment network (Visa, MasterCard, Discover, 
and American Express), which processes the transactions. Like debit 
and credit cards, prepaid cards also have an issuing bank which holds 
the funds stored on cards.45 Because many prepaid card users do not 
have traditional bank accounts, industry members devised alternative 
mechanisms for distributing their cards to the public. Certain companies 
facilitate fulfillment and shipment of the cards, process transactions, and 
track and distribute funds held in the issuing financial institution.46 The 
“program manager” provides the retail interface for the card and handles 
the marketing and day-to-day operations of the card program.47 
“Loading networks” are outlets located in retail stores where 
cardholders can acquire a card and add value initially or later by giving 
cash to a merchant.48 
Cards themselves are distributed at the retail level by distributors and 
marketers, such as ACE Cash Express, Walgreens, CVS, Walmart, 
Kroger, Safeway, gas stations, and Western Union. These retail-level 
distributors act as agents for the loading networks and provide locations 
                                                                                                                     
 41. See LINKAGE RESEARCH & CONSULTING, INC., AFRICAN AMERICAN CONSUMERS & 
RELOADABLE PREPAID CARDS: PREPAID CARDS HELP AFRICAN AMERICANS CONTROL SPENDING, AVOID 
OVERDRAFT AND ACCESS THE FINANCIAL MAINSTREAM 2 (2011), available at http://www.nbpca. 
com/en/Research-and-Publications/Research-Articles/NUL-Survey-Linkage-Research.aspx. As 
discussed below, this relative satisfaction with prepaid cards may also reflect a high level of 
dissatisfaction with alternatives. 
 42. Id. 
 43. MADELINE K. AUFSEESER, AITE GRP., GPR CARDHOLDERS: WHO ARE THEY REALLY? 
DISPELLING THE MYTHS 7 (2012), available at http://www.nbpca.org/~/media/E6E6F720492F4 
E42804FED2A795D3B5A.ashx. 
 44. See CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, THE NONPROFIT’S GUIDE TO PREPAID CARDS 14 
(2010), available at http://cfsinnovation.com/system/files/CFSI%20Nonprofit%20Guide%20to 
%20Prepaid.pdf. 
 45. Id. at 9. 
 46. These include companies such as FIS, FirstData, MT&L, and FSV Payment Systems. 
Id. at 18. 
 47. These include companies such as Account Now, Green Dot, NetSpend, and RushCard. 
Id. 
 48. “Loading networks” include brands such as Green Dot, Western Union, MoneyGram, 
Visa ReadyLink, and MasterCard rePower. Id. 
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where consumers can load or reload their cards. NetSpend, one of the 
largest networks, has over 100,000 loading locations in retail stores.49 
Consumers can also acquire, load, and reload their cards online. 
According to Javelin Strategy & Research, 48% of prepaid card users 
reload online, more than any other way.50 Check cashers, such as ACE 
Cash Express, which traditionally competed with prepaid cards, are now 
becoming outlets for retail distribution of reloadable prepaid cards. 
Some prepaid card companies, such as NetSpend and Green Dot, are 
partially vertically integrated and provide several different functions in 
the value and distribution chain, such as program manager, distributor, 
and reloading network. 
Because of the large number of players involved in the distribution and 
operation of prepaid cards, prepaid cards have a more complicated supply 
chain than debit and credit cards. The large number of players in the 
system and the important role played by nonfinancial institutions raises 
the risk of greater insolvency and security breaches for prepaid cards than 
those presented by other types of payment cards.51 For example, the 
system of reloading cards at tens of thousands of nonfinancial retailers 
raises special problems of security, fraud, and misuse. 
Prepaid cards generate several different revenue streams, including 
retail fees, card fees, and interchange fees, but those revenue streams are 
divided amongst many different actors. The links in the prepaid card 
value chain are generally low-margin businesses in which revenue is 
generated by a very large number of customers who generate multiple 
small fees. Moreover, the revenue generated for the industry is shared 
among the many parties along the supply chain. The fixed costs of 
setting up systems and contractual relationships are relatively high and 
the average ownership duration of a given card is only six months, 
approximately 5% to 15% of the average length of a checking 
account.52 Thus, the prepaid card companies must recoup fixed costs in 
a relatively short time frame. Also, the revenues generated from any 
customer are relatively low when compared to debit cards or credit 
cards. Wilshusen et al. estimate that the typical prepaid card generates at 
most $12 per month in revenue.53 One reason for low revenues is that 
                                                                                                                     
 49. About NetSpend, NETSPEND, https://www.netspend.com/about_netspend (last visited 
May 27, 2013). 
 50. JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 29 fig.14. Forty-four percent 
reported reloading at a merchant or retailer, 27% at a money services provider, 23% at a bank 
branch, and 17% at an ATM. Id. 
 51. See Philip Keitel, Insolvency Risk in the Network-Branded Prepaid-Card Value Chain 3 
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Discussion Paper, 2011), available at http://www.phil.frb.org/consumer-
credit-and-payments/payment-cards-center/publications/discussion-papers/2011/D-2011-September-
NBPCA-Keitel.pdf. 
 52. Wilshusen et al., supra note 29, at 18. 
 53. Id. at 5. 
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customers tend to be relatively young and lower income, generating a 
lower volume and dollar amount of transactions than debit or credit card 
users. 
C.  Prepaid Card Fees 
The most common criticism of prepaid cards concerns fees—fees for 
issuance, activation, reloading, ATM usage, and customer service.54 A 
study by Pew Charitable Trusts of fifty-two prepaid card programs in 
2011 found that most cards have seven to fifteen fees and that 
disclosure of fees is not uniform.55 But many criticisms of prepaid card 
fees are overstated or outdated. In practice, very few cards impose all 
possible fees. Instead, different cards offer different mixes of fees 
designed to appeal to different types of customers. For example, a 
particular card might charge a higher monthly fee than its competitors 
but not charge any fees for speaking to a customer service 
representative or for providing a paper statement. 
Moreover, the size of fees declined over time as a result of 
competition and consumer choice. Consumer Reports found in a recent 
survey that although activation fees used were standard fixtures in the 
past, only about half of the sixteen most popular cards charge an 
activation fee today. In addition, Pew’s study found, for example, that 
when companies charge fees (other than activation and monthly fees, 
when those fees are charged), the fees are mostly small, less than $3 and 
frequently $1 or less.56 Moreover, some large card issuers, such as 
NetSpend and Western Union, that previously charged activation fees 
no longer do so.57 Those that continue to charge activation fees (such as 
the RushCard) substantially lowered them.58 AccountNow pays a rebate 
to those who activate direct deposit on their cards.59 The Bluebird 
prepaid card, co-branded between American Express and Walmart in 
October 2012, has no annual fee, monthly fee, or activation fee.60 
The most common fee is a monthly maintenance fee, although these 
                                                                                                                     
 54. See, e.g., CONSUMER REPORTS, PREPAIDCARDS: LOADED WITH FEES, WEAK ON 
PROTECTIONS 4 (2012), available at http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/Prepaid_Cards_Report 
_2012.pdf. 
 55. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, LOADED WITH UNCERTAINTY: ARE PREPAID CARDS A SMART 
ALTERNATIVE TO CHECKING ACCOUNTS? 2 (2012), available at http://www.pewstates.org/ 
uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2012/Pew_prepaid_report.pdf. 
 56. Id. at 8. For example, although nine card programs charge a fee of $1 or $1.25 when a 
point-of-sale (POS) transaction is declined (depending on whether it is signature or PIN debit 
that is declined), forty-three do not. Id. at 2–3. 
 57. See CONSUMER REPORTS, supra note 54, at 5. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Robin Sidel & Andrew R. Johnson, Prepaid Enters Mainstream, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 
2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044489730457804431383162549 2.html.  
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fees are falling. Thirteen of sixteen cards surveyed by Consumer 
Reports charge monthly fees ranging from $2.95 to $9.95, although six 
of the thirteen cards that charge a monthly fee will waive the monthly 
fee or charge a lower monthly fee if the cardholder direct deposits a 
certain minimum amount each month, loads a specified amount each 
month, or makes a certain minimum number of transactions each 
month.61 Some cards provide consumers with the option of paying a 
monthly fee (with free transactions) or instead electing a per-transaction 
fee without a monthly fee.62 Most of the cards examined by Consumer 
Reports charged no point-of-sale (POS) transaction fees. Very few cards 
charge overdraft fees, primarily because few allow overdrafts. Some 
cards, however, allow cardholders to nominally overdraft on their 
accounts in some circumstances without charging any fee for doing so.63 
Other than monthly fees, the amount of fees paid is substantially 
under the consumer’s control and is related to how the card is used 
(especially ATM use frequency), the frequency and amount of reloading 
money, and the use of direct deposit.64 Pew found that fifty-one of the 
fifty-two cards it examined allowed consumers to avoid loading fees by 
using direct deposit. To acquire cash without paying ATM fees, 
consumers can opt for cash back when making a POS PIN purchase.65 
Although most cards permit customers to view their account balances 
and some form of transaction history online for free, there is usually a 
charge associated with obtaining a paper statement.66 
Wilshusen et al. found that the distribution of fees varies according 
to the distribution channel through which a consumer obtains a card. As 
noted, the distribution channel appears to indicate whether the consumer 
uses the prepaid card for a short-term purpose (acquired through a 
retailer) or as more of a long-term bank substitute (acquired through the 
Internet). As a result, the distribution of fees varies according to the 
card plan chosen by the consumer and the manner of use. They find that 
for GPR cards obtained through the Internet, fees such as maintenance 
and origination fees comprise about 52% of the fees charged, ATM 
withdrawal fees comprise 22%, and transaction and other fees (such as 
those for POS transactions, balance inquiries, obtaining a paper 
statement, or calling customer service) are 26%.67 For retail GPR cards, 
                                                                                                                     
 61. CONSUMER REPORTS, supra note 54, at 6. 
 62. Id.  
 63. According to the Pew study, 65% of cards disclosed that overdraft was not allowed 
and a fee was not allowed. Only 10% explicitly stated that there was a fee for overdrawing and 
the median fee was $15. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 55, at 21. 
 64. CARD HUB, PREPAID CARDS REPORT—2011 (2011), available at http://www.cardhub. 
com/edu/prepaid-cards-report-2011/. 
 65. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 55, at 9. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Wilshusen et al., supra note 29, at 31–32, 60 fig. 5.2. 
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by contrast, maintenance and origination fees comprise only 28% of 
fees, ATM withdrawal fees are 17%, and the majority of fees (55%) are 
for transactions and other fees.68 These different fee distributions are 
consistent with the suggested pattern of use by consumers of GPR cards 
for differing purposes.69 Moreover, although ATM fees are an important 
component of cardholder cost, the average fee charged (ranging from 
$1.50 to $2.25) is consistent with the typical foreign ATM fee ($1.65) 
charged for debit card transactions in 2010.70 
Fees are falling in response to competitive pressures as the market 
grows and scale economies evolve. According to the Federal Reserve’s 
Survey of Consumer Payment Choice, from 2008 to 2009, the 
percentage of consumers that rated prepaid cards as “low cost” or “very 
low cost” rose from 36% in 2008 to 45.6% in 2009.71 This increase in 
the perceived affordability of prepaid cards while bank accounts became 
more expensive may explain why prepaid card usage rose relative to 
debit card usage during that time.72 According to NetSpend’s public 
reports, the percentage of customers electing to use direct deposit is 
growing as well, rising from 34% in 2010 to 41% in 2011. This increase 
signals that consumers are increasingly using their prepaid cards like 
bank accounts. The increase also means that more consumers are taking 
advantage of the lower costs of cards that feature direct deposit.73 
Growing economies of scale and increasing consumer familiarity 
and competition should continue to produce declining costs over time. 
For example, Green Dot is purchasing a small bank in Utah to decrease 
the service fees that it pays to third parties, particularly the third-party 
bank that issues Green Dot cards.74 Entry by large banks may lower 
costs as well. For example, JPMorgan Chase’s Liquid card charges a 
flat fee of $4.95 per month with no other fees (other than foreign ATM 
fees) and provides free customer service, free access to Chase’s ATM 
network, and free reloading through Chase’s branches, ATMs, or 
                                                                                                                     
 68. Id. at 32–33, 61 fig. 5.3. 
 69. Payroll cards exhibit different patterns of fee activity: over half (54%) of the fees 
generated by payroll cards are for ATM withdrawals and just 10% are maintenance fees. Id. at 
31–32, 59 fig. 5.1. 
 70. Id. at 32. Pew similarly found an average ATM fee of $2.25. PEW CHARITABLE 
TRUSTS, supra note 55, at 8. The Bankrate.com 2012 study found that the average ATM fee for 
out-of-network transactions was $2.50 to the owner of the ATM and $1.57 to the customer’s 
bank. See Bell, Checking Fees Rise, supra note 10. 
 71. Foster et al., supra note 24, at 30. 
 72. Id. at 30–31. 
 73. Press Release, NetSpend Holdings, Inc., NetSpend Holdings, Inc. Reports Fourth 
Quarter Financial Results (Feb. 16, 2012), http://investor.netspend.com/releasedetail.cfm? 
releaseid=649475. 
 74. Green Dot Buying Small Utah Bank, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 23, 2011, 
4:43 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9R6MI0G0.htm.  
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remote deposits by cellphone.75 
II.  REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
As prepaid card usage grows, regulatory scrutiny increases as well, 
both at the state and federal levels. Legislators animated by the sense 
that the fees charged for various prepaid card services are “unfair” or 
“excessive” impose new regulations on prepaid card terms and 
disclosures in the name of safety and soundness or consumer protection. 
A.  Direct Regulation of Prepaid Cards 
The Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) and the implementing 
regulation, Regulation E, regulate at the federal level certain prepaid 
cards. For example, the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and 
Disclosure Act of 2009 (CARD Act) amended the EFTA in three ways 
with regard to prepaid cards. First, the CARD Act added new disclosure 
requirements regarding fees for store gift cards and general-use prepaid 
cards that are issued for personal and family use. Second, the CARD 
Act limited the circumstances under which a card may feature an 
expiration date.76 Third, the Federal Reserve Board acted under 
Regulation E and imposed disclosure requirements on prepaid payroll 
and government benefit cards but not general-purpose prepaid cards. 
State governments also regulate prepaid cards, particularly their sale 
and administration, by placing limits on expiration dates and fees, 
requiring certain disclosures, and mandating cash redemption of unused 
card balances. California law, for example, prohibits gift cards from 
expiring, limits dormancy fees, and requires that the cards are 
redeemable for cash.77 Further legislation is under consideration in 
several states and Puerto Rico now as well.78 These state laws are 
considered more protective of consumers than federal law. Under the 
federal EFTA, state laws are preserved as long as they are not 
inconsistent with the EFTA. 
Congress is also considering new legislation to regulate prepaid 
cards. Legislation introduced by Senator Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) 
                                                                                                                     
 75. See Chase Liquid Prepaid Card, CARDHUB.COM, http://www.cardhub.com/d/liquid-
prepaid-card-684c (last visited July 18, 2013). 
 76. Requirements for Gift Cards and Gift Certificates, 12 C.F.R. § 1005.20(a) (2012). 
 77. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1749.5 (2013). 
 78. See H.B. 4451, 98th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2012), available at http://www.ilga.gov/ 
legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=4451&GAID=11&DocTypeID=HB&LegID=63812&SessionID=
84&SpecSess=&Session=&GA=98 (Illinois); Prepaid Debit Cards, Fees and Impending Regulations, 
CREDITKARMA (June 22, 2012), http://blog.creditkarma.com/banking/prepaid-debit-cards-fees-and-
impending-regulations (New Jersey); Puerto Rico Legislature Passes Fee Restrictions for Prepaid, 
Industry Urged to Contact Gov. Immediately, PAYBEFORE.COM (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.paybefore. 
com/aboutus/default. aspx?id=25438 (Puerto Rico). 
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would impose new substantive and disclosure requirements on prepaid 
card products.79 The legislation would, among other provisions, require 
“pass-through” coverage to consumers of FDIC deposit insurance for 
prepaid card accounts.80 More controversially, the legislation would 
prohibit fees for a large number of card issuer services. The legislation 
would, for example, prohibit the imposition of any “per-transaction” fee 
for POS usage or for in-network ATM usage.81 In addition, the 
legislation would prohibit prepaid card companies from imposing fees 
for balance inquiries, customer service inquiries, dormancy, account 
closing, or overdrafts.82 The legislation would permit reload fees only if 
the financial institution provided “a reasonable alternate method for 
adding value” without a fee.83 The overall effect of the legislation 
would dramatically affect the market and consumers: it essentially 
would ban cards priced on a per-transaction basis, and force all cards to 
adopt a one-size-fits-all model of a flat monthly fee for “all you can eat” 
free usage. Such legislation would negatively affect consumers who 
prefer cards priced on a per-transaction basis because they use their 
cards lightly and for specific reasons.84 The bill would also require the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to issue a new rule 
providing a standardized disclosure format for prepaid card fees and 
prices.85 
Additionally, the CFPB will have both the authority to regulate the 
offering and provision of “consumer financial products,” including 
prepaid cards, and the authority to issue any rules that the CFPB 
determines to be “necessary or appropriate” to carry out the objectives 
of federal consumer financial protection laws.86 With respect to prepaid 
cards, the CFPB inherited the Federal Reserve’s authority under 
Regulation E to regulate prepaid cards. In addition, the CFPB is 
responsible for monitoring developments in the prepaid market and 
                                                                                                                     
 79. See Prepaid Card Consumer Protection Act of 2011, S. 2030, 113th Cong (2011). 
 80. Id. Unlike funds held in standard bank accounts, prepaid cards do not provide 
automatic insurance for an individual’s funds loaded onto a prepaid card because the prepaid 
card program manager pools all of its customers’ funds in a single account. Nevertheless, the 
FDIC established procedures that banks can follow to provide “pass-through” insurance in the 
name of the individual cardholder instead of the program manager that owns the pooled account. 
In fact, it appears that every card program backed by a federally insured depository institution 
provides pass-through deposit insurance to the individual cardholder. See discussion infra notes 
250–56 and accompanying text. 
 81. S. 2030. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id.  
 84. See infra notes 245–47 and accompanying text (noting that consumers 
overwhelmingly choose correctly between the two different card pricing schemes). 
 85. S. 2030 § 3(e)(3). 
 86. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1958 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1002(15)(A)(v), 1022). 
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determining whether to propose additional consumer protections. 
Pursuant to this authority, the CFPB issued an Announcement of 
Proposed Rulemaking and held a field hearing on prepaid card 
regulation.87 The CFPB’s announcement asks for comments on a variety 
of issues: the degree to which Regulation E should cover general-
purpose prepaid cards; how to regulate prepaid cards to promote 
competition and consumer choice; and whether to mandate special 
disclosures for cards that do not offer pass-through of FDIC insurance.88 
In addition, the CFPB asks for comments on various features of prepaid 
cards, such as overdraft protection, savings accounts, and the ability to 
build credit by reporting prepaid card bill payments to credit reporting 
agencies.89 
New regulations imposed on bank overdraft fees beginning in 2009 
are indirectly relevant to understanding the market for prepaid cards. By 
limiting overdraft fees, these regulations reduce access to free checking 
and consequently increase the number of unbanked consumers. 
According to Evans, Litan, and Schmalensee, “within days” of the Fed’s 
announcement of its new rules, banks started scaling back access to free 
checking, imposing new fees, and eliminating services for consumers.90 
The number of accounts eligible for free checking fell 11 percentage 
points—from 76% in 2009 to 65% in 2010—a figure that translates to 
approximately twenty million accounts.91 The combination of price 
controls on debit card interchange fees and limits on access to overdraft 
protection dramatically reduced access to free checking, swelled the 
ranks of the unbanked, and in turn, increased demand for prepaid cards. 
B.  The Durbin Amendment 
Recent regulations of debit and credit cards indirectly promoted their 
substitution with prepaid cards. The Durbin Amendment to the Dodd-
Frank financial reform legislation places price controls on debit card 
interchange fees, and requires that the fees remain “reasonable and 
proportional” to the card issuer’s marginal cost.92 Effective October 1, 
2011, “reasonable and proportional” fees are not to exceed the sum of 
twenty-one cents and “5 basis points multiplied by the value of the 
                                                                                                                     
 87. Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 77 Fed. Reg. 30,923 (proposed May 24, 
2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1005). 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id.  
 90. David S. Evans, Robert E. Litan & Richard Schmalensee, Economic Analysis of the 
Effects of the Federal Reserve Board’s Proposed Debit Card Interchange Fee Regulations on 
Consumers and Small Businesses 31 (Feb. 22, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1769887. 
 91. Id. 
 92. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(2) (2011). 
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transaction.”93 This cut in the interchange fee rate is estimated to cost 
banks over $6 billion in revenue annually. It prompted banks to recover 
the loss by levying new fees on checking accounts, raising minimum 
balance requirements, terminating debit card rewards programs, charging 
higher out-of-network ATM fees, providing incentives to use credit and 
prepaid cards, and driving away customers who are no longer profitable.94 
These new higher fees will eventually push an estimated 5% of consumers 
out of the mainstream banking system95 and increase the number of 
unbanked consumers by 1 million.96 The Durbin Amendment will likely 
adversely impact younger, less educated, and lower-income consumers the 
most, especially those with lower credit scores. They will find bank 
accounts more expensive, less available, and of lower quality (such as 
fewer services, fewer branches, and shorter and less convenient banking 
hours and locations).97 Now, some banks offer prepaid cards to consumers 
when they are rejected for a checking account because they no longer 
qualify in the current economic and regulatory environment.98 Even if 
merchants pass on to consumers the savings from decreased debit 
interchange fees, low-income consumers who either struggle to meet 
minimum balance requirements or who have poor credit will likely switch 
to prepaid cards to avoid these new fees.99 
The average interchange fee on prepaid cards is approximately forty 
cents per transaction.100 Interchange fees are an important revenue 
source for prepaid cards: during the first quarter of 2011, interchange 
revenue comprised 32% of operating revenue at Green Dot and 24% at 
NetSpend.101 Wilshusen et al. find that interchange fees comprise about 
                                                                                                                     
 93. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 12 C.F.R. § 235.3(b) (2012). 
 94. Tim Chen, What the Durbin Amendment Means for You, U.S. NEWS (July 12, 2011), 
http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/my-money/2011/07/12/what-the-durbin-amendment-me ans-
for-you. For example, many debit card issuers subject to the price controls eliminate rewards on debit 
cards but preserve them for credit and prepaid cards. About half of prepaid card users say that the 
availability of rewards on prepaid cards increases the likelihood that they would use them. See Prepaid 
Cards Lure Underbanked and Gen Y Customers, JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH (Apr. 11, 2012), 
https://www.javelinstrategy.com/news/1326/92/Prepaid-Cards-Lure-Underbanked-and-Gen-Y-
Consumers/ d,pressRoomDetail. 
 95. BRETTON WOODS, INC., supra note 20, at 14. 
 96. Evans et al., supra note 90, at 4. 
 97. See Fumiko Hayashi & Joanna Stavins, Effects of Credit Scores on Consumer Payment 
Choice 1, 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos. Public Policy Discussion Paper No. 12-1, 2012). 
 98. Elizabeth Ody, Prepaid Card Use Up 18% as Consumers Drop Debit: Study, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 11, 2012, 10:07 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/news/ 
2012-04-11/prepaid-card-use-up-18-percent-as-consumers-drop-debit-study. 
 99. Chen, supra note 94. 
 100. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 2009 INTERCHANGE REVENUE, 
COVERED ISSUER COST, AND COVERED ISSUER AND MERCHANT FRAUD LOSS RELATED TO DEBIT 
CARD TRANSACTIONS 8 (2011), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/ 
files/debitfees _costs.pdf. 
 101. Jennifer Tescher, Durbin’s Unintended Consequences for the Underbanked, AM. 
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20% of issuer revenue for GPR cards and about half of revenue for 
payroll cards.102 Increased marketing of prepaid cards in an effort to 
switch debit card users to prepaid cards or to attract new customers may 
offset 20%–50% of the losses in debit interchange revenue.103 
Prepaid cards, however, are not entirely free from the Durbin 
Amendment’s reach. For the purposes of 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2, “debit 
card” is defined to include general-use prepaid cards, as set forth in 15 
U.S.C. § 1693l-1(a)(2)(A).104 “Small issuers,”105 those with assets 
below $10 billion, are exempt.106 Prepaid cards issued by banks with 
more than $10 billion in assets, however, are exempt only if they do not 
provide access to funds by check, Automated Clearing House (ACH), or 
wire transfer. This narrow exception, which Congress intended to 
prevent large banks from evading the Durbin Amendment’s price 
controls by effectively converting prepaid cards into de facto debit 
cards, means that large banks can only offer prepaid cards with reduced 
functionality. In particular, large banks cannot offer online bill pay, 
recurring ACH debit (such as to pay utility bills), or funds transfer 
among different accounts (such as the transfer of funds from a prepaid 
card to an interest-bearing savings account). If large banks offer these 
                                                                                                                     
BANKER (July 26, 2011, 6:06 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/Durbin-debit-
interchange-prepaid-underbanked-1040610-1.html. 
 102. Wilshusen et al., supra note 29, at 6. 
 103. Recouping Lost Debit Interchange Fees with Prepaid Cards, AITE GROUP (Mar. 21, 
2011), http://www.aitegroup.com/Reports/ReportDetail.aspx?recordItemID=770. 
 104. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693o-2(c)(2) defines the term “debit card” as follows: 
(A) means any card, or other payment code or device, issued or approved for 
use through a payment card network to debit an asset account (regardless of the 
purpose for which the account is established), whether authorization is based on 
signature, PIN, or other means; 
(B) includes a general-use prepaid card, as that term is defined in section 1693l-
1(a)(2)(A) of this title; and 
(C) does not include paper checks. 
Id. 15 U.S.C. § 1693l-1(a)(2)(A) defines “general-use prepaid card” as follows: 
[A] card or other payment code or device issued by any person that is— 
(i) redeemable at multiple, unaffiliated merchants or service providers, or 
automated teller machines; 
(ii) issued in a requested amount, whether or not that amount may, at the option 
of the issuer, be increased in value or reloaded if requested by the holder; 
(iii) purchased or loaded on a prepaid basis; and 
(iv) honored, upon presentation, by merchants for goods or services, or at 
automated teller machines. 
Id. 
 105. A “small issuer” includes “any issuer that, together with its affiliates, has assets of less 
than $10,000,000,000.” 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(6)(A) (2012). 
 106. Id. § 1693o-2(a)(6)(A)–(B). 
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functions, they are subject to the Durbin Amendment’s price controls on 
interchange fees. Thus, in addition to swelling the Durbin Amendment’s 
ranks of the underbanked, it could also stifle the evolution of prepaid 
cards into low-cost bank account substitutes for unbanked and 
underbanked consumers. 
Moreover, by forcing traditional banks to offer cards with reduced 
functionality, the Durbin Amendment deprives consumers of potential 
benefits that banks are uniquely positioned to offer. For example, when 
the consumer website NerdWallet.com surveyed the prices of prepaid 
cards, it found that large banks issued two of the three least expensive 
cards.107 The Chase Liquid card is especially instructive: for a monthly 
flat fee of $4.95, it offers free usage of Chase’s 17,000 ATMs; free 
access to its 10,500 branches; free customer service with a live agent; 
free reloading through ATMs, branches, or mobile banking; and even 
free paper bank statements.108 Chase designed the Liquid card as an 
alternative to a traditional checking account. As one review notes, 
however, “[T]he Liquid card doesn’t [offer] much in the way of an 
automatic online bill pay option.”109 What the review failed to note, 
however, is that Chase is unable to provide Liquid with an online bill 
pay feature and other similar functionalities because these features 
trigger the Durbin Amendment’s interchange price controls. Notably, 
American Express’s low-fee Bluebird card offers automatic bill pay—
but only because as a non-bank it is not covered by the Durbin 
Amendment and can thus offer bill pay without triggering the Durbin 
Amendment’s interchange price controls.110 
Other exemptions from the Durbin Amendment’s reach include 
reloadable prepaid cards that are either government-issued or meet the 
criteria set forth in § 1693o-2(a)(7)(A)(ii), namely, that consumers 
cannot use the cards to access funds held in a separate account, such as 
a bank account (i.e., they are essentially not debit cards).111 
                                                                                                                     
 107. The two cards were U.S. Bank Convenient Cash Card ($39 per year) and 
ATIRAreload Card ($54 per year). Out of 82 Prepaid Debit Cards, Find the One for You, 
NERDWALLET, http://www.nerdwallet.com/prepaid (last visited July 23, 2013). 
 108. Id.  
 109. Jill Krasny & Zachry Floro, Chase’s New Prepaid Card Actually Looks Like a Decent 
Product, BUSINESSINSIDER (July 10, 2012, 1:24 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ 
reviewing-chases-new-prepaid-card-chase-liquid-2012-7. 
 110. See Matt Townsend, Wal-Mart Offers Bank Account Option with American Express, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 9, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-09/wal-mart-
offers-bank-account-option-with-american-express.html. 
 111. Exempt reloadable prepaid cards include those that are government-issued or in 
compliance with a five-factor test. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(7)(A) (2012). Factors include any 
“plastic card, payment code, or device” that is 
(I) linked to funds, monetary value, or assets which are purchased or loaded on 
a prepaid basis; 
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Notwithstanding these exemptions, the Durbin Amendment became 
effective July 21, 2011112 for interchange transaction fees charged with 
respect to government-issued prepaid cards, and for § 1693o-
2(a)(7)(A)(ii)-compliant prepaid cards that subject the cardholder to 
either of the following: (1) a “fee for an overdraft, including a shortage 
of funds or a transaction processed for an amount exceeding the account 
balance” or (2) a “fee imposed by the issuer for the first withdrawal per 
month from an automated teller machine that is part of the issuer's 
designated automated teller machine network.”113 
III.  THE ECONOMICS OF PREPAID CARDS: WHO USES THEM AND WHY 
General-purpose prepaid cards occupy a unique position in the 
payments landscape. In terms of functionality they are virtually 
identical to credit cards and debit cards. Each of the three carries fees, 
and in theory these products compete against one another. The primary 
differences are temporal, not functional. Consumers pay for prepaid 
card purchases prior to use, debit card purchases contemporaneously 
with use, and credit card purchases after use. 
What historically distinguished prepaid cards from debit and credit 
cards was the user base, not the basic product. Prepaid card users 
traditionally are unbanked as well as lower-income, less educated, less 
financially sophisticated, and able to access fewer payments options 
than consumers with bank accounts. For this group, the relevant 
comparison is not debit and credit cards (to which they have little 
access) but rather cash-based financial services that cater to unbanked 
individuals, most notably check cashing and money orders. Prepaid 
cards offer superior functionality, convenience, and price compared to 
these alternatives. 
Yet, this picture is changing rapidly as prepaid cards become 
increasingly mainstream. As competition increases, fees fall and 
functionality rises. Now, some consumers choose prepaid cards 
                                                                                                                     
(II) not issued or approved for use to access or debit any account held by or for 
the benefit of the card holder (other than a subaccount or other method of 
recording or tracking funds purchased or loaded on the card on a prepaid basis); 
(III) redeemable at multiple, unaffiliated merchants or service providers, or 
automated teller machines; 
(IV) used to transfer or debit funds, monetary value, or other assets; and 
(V) reloadable and not marketed or labeled as a gift card or gift certificate.  
Id. § 1693o-2(a)(7)(A)(ii). 
 112. The exception set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(7)(B) applies “after the end of the 
1-year period beginning on the effective date provided in paragraph (9).” Id. § 1693o-2(a)(9) 
provides that the subsection “shall take effect at the end of the 12-month period beginning on 
July 21, 2010.” See also 12 C.F.R. 235.5(d) (2012). 
 113. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(7)(B)(i)–(ii) (2012). 
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voluntarily over debit and credit cards. 
A.  Profile of Prepaid Card Customers 
There is little systematic research of the demographic profile of 
prepaid card customers. Historically, prepaid card users were comparable 
to those who use alternative financial products generally—relatively 
young, lower-income, suffering from tarnished credit, or otherwise 
excluded from the mainstream financial system. But as GPR prepaid cards 
are becoming more popular, they are also becoming more mainstream 
demographically and are prospering in certain middle-class niches. 
The unintended consequences of recent regulatory interventions are 
particularly important in promoting adoption of prepaid cards by two 
groups. The first group is low-income consumers who are driven out of 
the banking system by new fees and other costs attributable to the 
Durbin Amendment, new restrictions on overdraft protection, and the 
CARD Act.114 The second group is younger consumers who, in addition 
to facing many of the same limits as low-income consumers (small 
average balances and an inability or unwillingness to pay new bank 
fees),115 also find it much more difficult to gain access to credit cards 
since the enactment of the CARD Act, which limits credit card access 
for those under twenty-one.116 At the same time, the virtual 
disappearance of check writing by younger consumers further promotes 
a reliance on electronic payments. Finally, unique product attributes 
such as parental control features open up prepaid cards to a new market 
range, such as students away at college. 
In one of the first studies of prepaid card customers, Rhine et al. 
studied 1,917 prepaid cardholders in 2007 to examine their demographic 
profiles and patterns of card usage.117 They found that prepaid card users 
were young: 82% were under the age of forty-five.118 They found that 
while most cardholders carried modest balances and used their cards 
primarily to pay bills and make POS transactions, some appeared to use 
                                                                                                                     
 114. JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 8–10. 
 115. For example, according to one study, 21% of Gen Y consumers do not have a 
checking account, compared to the national average of 12%. Id. at 25. 
 116. Id. at 8. 
 117. SHERRIE L.W. RHINE ET AL., THE CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, CARDHOLDER USE 
OF GENERAL SPENDING PREPAID CARDS: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE MARKET 5, 18 (2007), available 
at http://www.cfsinnovation.com/system/files/imported/managed_documents/general_spending 
_prepaid_cards.pdf. 
 118. Id. at 21; see also Ronald J. Mann, Adopting, Using, and Discarding Paper and 
Electronic Payment Instruments: Variation by Age and Race 14–15 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos. 
Consumer Payments Research Ctr. Pub. Policy Discussion Paper No. 11-2, 2011) (finding 
prepaid card users to be younger on average than debit or credit card users), available at 
http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/ppdp/2011/ ppdp1102.pdf. 
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them as a substitute for a traditional bank account.119 For example, 
although most users reloaded their cards infrequently, 16% loaded them 
twice or more a month.120 In addition, those who reloaded more frequently 
loaded larger value loads on average, which suggested that they used their 
cards as a substitute for a traditional bank account.121 
For withdrawals, Rhine et al. found that the average value of a POS 
transaction was $39.48, and funds withdrawn from ATMs averaged 
$41.35 per transaction.122 The average cardholder maintained a monthly 
utilization rate of 92%, which indicated that most of the funds that were 
added to the account were later spent. Seventy-one percent of the funds 
were used for POS transactions and 21% were withdrawn from ATMs, 
suggesting that the primary usage was for electronic payments rather 
than cash access.123 Those who loaded funds less frequently also tended 
to have higher utilization rates and were somewhat more likely to use 
their cards for POS purposes than for ATMs.124 Those who loaded their 
cards more frequently (two or more times per month) made an average 
of 2.2 ATM and 9.6 POS transactions per month.125 Forty-five percent 
of cardholders did not access their accounts through an ATM during the 
month, and 28% did so less than once per month.126 As with deposits, 
those who accessed their accounts more than twice per month also 
tended to make larger ATM withdrawals.127 For POS transactions, only 
6% of those surveyed did not use their cards at all during a month, and 
27% did so less than once per month.128 However, 14% made POS 
transactions three to five times per month and 24% did so more than 
five times per month.129 
In 2009, Gordon, Romich, and Waithaka conducted in-depth focus 
group interviews with 12 AccountNow prepaid card customers and 10 
NetSpend prepaid card customers.130 They found that the typical 
cardholder was low income, with a median post-tax personal income of 
$17,500 for AccountNow customers and $22,100 for NetSpend 
customers.131 They also found a substantial income range: The incomes 
of the surveyed AccountNow customers ranged from $15,000 to 
                                                                                                                     
 119. RHINE ET AL., supra note 117, at 22. 
 120. Id. at 23. 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. at 22. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 27. 
 125. Id. at 28. 
 126. Id. at 24. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 25. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Gordon, Romich & Waithaka, supra note 38, at 2, 9. 
 131. Id. at 10. 
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$160,000 and the NetSpend customers’ incomes ranged from $12,000 to 
$55,000.132 Additionally, the surveyed prepaid card users were 
significantly less likely than the general population to own a home: only 
25% of the AccountNow customers were homeowners and none of the 
NetSpend customers owned their homes.133 Debt levels were significant 
relative to income levels for participants in the survey: fewer than 20% 
were debt-free; median debt levels were $10,000 and $8,250 
respectively for AccountNow and NetSpend customers; and 
AccountNow customers’ debt ranged up to $45,000 and NetSpend 
customers’ debt ranged up to $175,000.134 Unpaid bills, especially 
unpaid utility bills and unpaid bank fees, constituted the main source of 
debt for prepaid card users.135 Over three-quarters of both AccountNow 
and NetSpend customers reported unpaid utility bills and bank fees.136 
These unpaid bills often led to the termination of customers’ accounts. 
Credit card debt and unpaid medical bills accounted for the bulk of the 
total amount of debt in dollar terms.137 Additionally, most of 
NetSpend’s customers carried small balances and used their cards for 
small transactions.138 The 2009 survey also found that the prepaid card 
customers used their cards to pay two to three bills per month (typically 
phone bills, utility bills, and car payments; they also used their cards for 
online shopping).139 The survey shows that at that time, prepaid cards 
were still largely an alternative financial product. 
More recent studies indicate that prepaid cards are becoming more 
mainstream and middle class. A study by Aite Group found that one-
third of prepaid card users earn more than $45,000 per year, 34% have a 
college degree or higher, and many maintain both a checking account 
and a credit card.140 It found that 40% of customers surveyed used their 
prepaid cards “most frequently” for POS purchases, 27% used them 
most frequently for online transactions, and 24% used them most 
frequently to pay bills.141 Only 9% reported using their cards most 
                                                                                                                     
 132. Id. at 11. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 10–11. 
 136. Id. at 11. 
 137. Id. at 10–11. Speaking recently before the Senate Subcommittee on Financial Institutions 
and Consumer Protection, NetSpend CEO Daniel Henry testified that nearly all NetSpend customers 
were “working” U.S. citizens, the majority having obtained at least a high school diploma and earning 
less than $50,000 per year. Examining Issues in the Prepaid Card Market: Hearing Before the S. 
Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. & Consumer Prot., 112th Cong. 2 (2012) [hereinafter Prepaid Card Hearing] 
(statement of Daniel R. Henry, CEO, NetSpend Holdings, Inc.) (2012). 
 138. Gordon, Romich & Waithaka, supra note 38, at 9. 
 139. Id. at 17. 
 140. AUFSEESER, supra note 43, at 3–4. 
 141. Id. at 9. 
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frequently at an ATM.142 The survey also found prepaid cards especially 
popular among younger consumers, with 43% of prepaid card 
customers being members of Generation Y at the time of the study.143 
A 2012 survey by Javelin Strategy & Research of more than 3,000 
Americans also found both high usage rates among unbanked and younger 
consumers and growing mainstream usage.144 Javelin found young and 
underbanked consumers almost twice as likely to use prepaid cards as 
baby boomers.145 As noted above, Javelin found a substantial drop in the 
number of consumers with debit and credit cards during that same period 
the percentage of U.S. adults with prepaid cards rose from 11% to 13%.146 
More than half of underbanked respondents (56%) said they used prepaid 
debit cards for routine online purchases.147 Moreover, Javelin found a 
dramatic rise in the percentage of the population without a checking 
account. From 2010 to 2011, the percentage increased from 8% to 12%.148 
But Javelin also noted an increasingly mainstream use of prepaid cards: 
although 17% of those earning under $15,000 per year used prepaid or 
payroll cards, the second largest group consisted of customers earning 
$75,000 to $99,000 per year (16%). Additionally, 13% of those earning 
over $150,000 per year owned prepaid cards in 2011.149 
Javelin’s analysis suggests that a growing number of underbanked 
consumers use prepaid cards like a traditional bank account.150 
Underbanked prepaid card owners reload their cards more frequently, 
make larger reloads than other prepaid card owners,151 and use their 
cards much more frequently for POS transactions.152 NetSpend also 
reports that by 2011, nearly 42% of its cardholders took advantage of 
the direct deposit feature, up from only 14% in 2007.153 Also, according 
to a 2012 news report, Green Dot stated that about half of its customer 
base uses direct deposit.154 Wilshusen et al. also found evidence that 
some consumers use prepaid cards as a substitute for a checking 
account. They found that some consumers retain prepaid cards for 
                                                                                                                     
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 3 
 144. JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 5–6. 
 145. Id. at 9. 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. at 20. 
 148. Id. at 9. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 14. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 22. 
 153. NETSPEND, 2011 NETSPEND HOLDINGS FORM 10-K 30 (2012), available at 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ABEA-56BIQV/1684506713x0xS1047469-12-1472/14 
96623/filing.pdf. 
 154. See Fields & Jackson-Randall, supra note 1.  
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extended periods and use them intensely and primarily for ongoing 
living expenses, rather than saving and financing large purchases.155 
They also found that ATM withdrawals comprise one-third to one-half 
of the value taken off the card and that the majority of POS transactions 
occur at grocery stores, fast food restaurants, and gas stations. This 
pattern, they concluded, “suggests that prepaid cards are used primarily 
to purchase nondurable goods.”156 
Other evidence points to rapid mainstreaming of prepaid card use. 
Green Dot states that its median customer income is about $45,000.157 
Schuh and Stavins found that adoption of prepaid cards was highest for 
the highest income group in their study, those making above $100,000 
per year.158 They found 26% of those with incomes above $100,000 per 
year owned prepaid cards, whereas only 15% of those with incomes 
under $25,000 per year or between $25,000 and $50,000 owned prepaid 
cards.159 In addition, those who attended post-graduate school were 
twice as likely to adopt prepaid cards (27%) as those with a high school 
degree or less (13%).160 On the other hand, the data collected by Schuh 
and Stavins are of insufficient granularity to fully explain these patterns 
of adoption because they include both open-loop and closed-loop cards 
as well as cards bought for others (although cards received from others 
are treated separately). Thus the data might include prepaid cards 
bought for others (such as children in college), closed-loop cards (such 
as gift cards), or reloadable closed-loop cards (such as Starbucks cards). 
Overall, prepaid cards traditionally aimed at low-income and 
unbanked consumers remain important for those groups and seem to 
grow in popularity. But more recent studies and other sources of 
information indicate prepaid cards are becoming more mainstream and 
that their demographic base is increasingly reaching toward middle-
class consumers. 
B.  Prepaid Cards Versus Debit and Credit Cards 
Many consumers prefer debit and credit cards to prepaid cards. 
Many consumers, however, are unable to obtain or maintain a bank 
account or to use a credit card responsibly. Others decide that prepaid 
cards offer sufficient functionality at lower prices than traditional bank 
accounts or credit cards. In particular, once the entire cost of a bank 
account or credit card is taken into account, some consumers, especially 
lower income consumers, may find prepaid cards less expensive. As a 
                                                                                                                     
 155. Wilshusen et al., supra note 29, at 5–6. 
 156. Id. at 6. 
 157. See Fields & Jackson-Randall, supra note 1. 
 158. Schuh & Stavins, supra note 4, at 25 tbl. 1. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
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result, some consumers may rationally choose to use prepaid cards 
instead of a bank account, even if they otherwise could maintain a bank 
account and carry a debit or credit card. According to a 2008 survey of 
2,799 underbanked and unbanked consumers, 55% of unbanked and 
18% of underbanked consumers prefer to use a prepaid card to a 
checking account.161 And according to another survey, a majority of 
prepaid card users prefer prepaid cards to credit cards.162 
Research reveals several reasons why prepaid card customers may 
prefer prepaid cards over bank accounts and credit cards: cost, 
alienation and distrust of the banking system, imposing self-control on 
spending decisions, and the growing functionality and similarities of 
prepaid cards to traditional banking products. 
1.  Cost 
Checking accounts may prove more expensive than prepaid cards for 
many consumers, especially lower income consumers who either 
experienced rising bank fees in recent years or those who frequently 
overdrew their accounts or bounced checks. The cost of prepaid cards 
may also prove lower for consumers with certain usage patterns or who 
use direct deposit (which enables the waiver of certain fees). The 
Bretton Woods economic consulting firm estimates that a low-balance 
bank customer who pays monthly account fees and makes five overdraft 
transactions per year will pay $179 to $464 per year in bank fees, 
compared to a range of $265.92 to $333.75 for prepaid cards without 
direct deposit and $97.56 to $238.95 for prepaid cards with direct 
deposit.163 Thus, although checking accounts may prove less expensive 
for most consumers (those who do not overdraft their accounts), prepaid 
cards often will prove less expensive for others, particularly those who 
frequently incur overdraft fees or do not use direct deposit. This is not 
to say that prepaid cards are less expensive or more expensive for every 
consumer at every time, but that in light of consumer heterogeneity, 
prepaid cards will prove less expensive for at least some consumers. 
Accordingly, regulators should preserve the prepaid card choice and 
neither favor nor disadvantage them by adopting regulatory dictates that 
                                                                                                                     
 161. CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, PREPAID CARD VS. CHECKING ACCOUNT 
PREFERENCES 1 (2008), http://cfsinnovation.com/system/files/imported/managed_documents/ 
prepaid_oct09_0001.pdf. Of underbanked consumers, 18.3% preferred prepaid cards to 
checking accounts. 
 162. AUFSEESER, supra note 43, at 6 (noting that 61% of prepaid card users prefer to use 
prepaid cards compared to only 33% that prefer to use credit cards). 
 163. BRETTON WOODS, INC., ANALYSIS OF BRANDED GENERAL PURPOSE RELOADABLE 
PREPAID CARDS: A COMPARATIVE COST ANALYSIS OF PREPAID CARDS, BASIC CHECKING 
ACCOUNTS AND CHECK CASHING 7 (2012), available at http://bretton-woods.com/ 
media/3e145204f3688479ffff832affffd524.pdf. 
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artificially push consumers toward debit or credit cards. 
A study by Javelin Strategy and Research conducted in the spring of 
2012 concluded that the annual consumer cost of maintaining a 
checking account averaged between $192 and $359 per customer.164 
Consumers pay about 21% more in fees for basic checking accounts 
than they did six years ago. Consumers pay on average about $7.72 per 
month in a combination of monthly and automated teller machine fees, 
or over $92 per year.165 According to a NerdWallet.com survey, unless 
certain minimum average balance or other similar conditions are met 
(which is unlikely for those who use prepaid cards), the average 
monthly fee for traditional checking accounts at the nation’s five largest 
banks ranged from $5 to $12, and these sums do not include additional 
fees that banks might assess.166 A 2012 survey by MoneyRates.com 
found that fees on checking accounts rose across the board from 2011 to 
2012, and included increases in the minimum deposit needed to open an 
account, increases in the minimum balance needed for free checking, 
and increases in average monthly maintenance fees from $12.08 to 
$12.26 per month.167 A study by Barrington Research estimated that the 
average checking account costs $279 per year for a typical user 
compared to prepaid cards, which costs $158.168 According to a survey 
of prepaid card users by Aite Group, 39% of respondents “strongly 
agreed” that prepaid cards cost less than checking accounts—more than 
twice the number of consumers of alternative financial services who 
still had bank accounts.169 And 37% strongly agreed that prepaid cards 
are “better overall” than checking accounts (compared to 15% of users 
of alternative financial services who still had bank accounts).170 These 
studies likely underestimate the value of prepaid cards because they 
consider only the direct financial costs of bank accounts versus prepaid 
cards and ignore other costs such as the “shoe leather” costs of 
reloading cards at over 100,000 retail locations. These costs can prove 
high, especially for those who lack convenient access to a bank branch 
                                                                                                                     
 164. JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 19. 
 165. See Elizabeth Ody, Regulation Fuels 21% Surge in Checking Fees, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 
29, 2012, 12:54 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-29/regulation-fuels-21-surge-
in-bank-checking-fees-javelin-says.html (citing study by Javelin Strategy & Research). 
 166. See NerdWallet Bank Fee Monitor: Average Big-Bank Checking Account Can Cost 
$110 a Year, NERDWALLET (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/2012/bank-fee-
monitor-average-bigbank-checking-account-cost-110-year. 
 167. See Barrington, supra note 12. 
 168. See David Sternman, This Small IPO Stock Could Jump as Much as 70%, 
STREETAUTHORITY.COM (Sept. 15, 2011, 1:00 PM), http://www.streetauthority.com/growth-
investing/small-ipo-stock-could-jump-much-70-458578. 
 169. The Debanked: A US$1 Billion Prepaid Debit Card Opportunity, AITE GRP. (Feb. 9, 
2012), http://www.aitegroup.com/Reports/ReportDetail.aspx?recordItemID=899. 
 170. Id. 
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or whose working hours make it inconvenient to bank at a traditional 
branch.171 
Pew conducted an in-depth comparison of prepaid and checking 
accounts and relied on a variety of assumptions about fees and 
consumer sophistication. Pew concluded that there is “no uniform 
answer” as to whether prepaid cards are more expensive than checking 
accounts because the answer depends greatly on how consumers use the 
alternative products.172 For example, examining the estimated costs for 
median users of the products, Pew found that for “savvy users” a 
checking account was slightly less expensive than a prepaid card ($4.50 
per month for prepaid cards versus $3.99 for checking accounts).173 For 
the median “basic” consumer, however, prepaid cards are less expensive 
than bank accounts ($22.15 per month for prepaid cards versus $28.00 
per month for checking accounts), and for “inexperienced” consumers 
prepaid cards are substantially less expensive ($28.70 per month for 
prepaid cards versus a $94.00 per month for checking accounts).174 
According to Pew, therefore, it is difficult to generalize whether 
consumers are better off with prepaid cards or checking accounts. Many 
basic and inexperienced consumers will likely benefit financially from 
using a prepaid card instead of a checking account. 
The demographics of prepaid card users also influence the relative 
superiority of prepaid cards versus bank accounts. Those who use 
prepaid cards typically do not have a large amount of liquid financial 
reserves that they can use to maintain a bank account in good standing. 
According to Daniel Henry, CEO of NetSpend, the company’s average 
customer card balance is below $100—far below the minimum balance 
threshold now required by many banks to qualify for free checking.175 
According to the Pew Foundation, the median minimum account 
balance necessary to waive monthly fees at most banks is $2,500, a sum 
that few prepaid card customers can likely meet.176 
2.  Alienation and Distrust of Banks 
A second reason why some consumers prefer to use prepaid cards 
instead of bank accounts is their alienation from and distrust of the 
traditional banking system. In fact, many unbanked consumers who use 
prepaid cards are so-called “debanked” consumers who previously 
maintained bank accounts but abandoned them either voluntarily or 
involuntarily due to cost or the inability to manage them responsibly. 
                                                                                                                     
 171. Prepaid Card Hearing, supra note 137, at 3. 
 172. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 55, at 15. 
 173. Id. at 16. 
 174. Id. at 17–18. 
 175. Prepaid Card Hearing, supra note 137, at 2. 
 176. Ody, supra note 165. 
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For example, of the 22 participants in the study by Gordon, Romich, 
and Waithaka, all but one previously had a bank account; but by the 
time they were interviewed as part of the study, 16 of 22 did not have a 
conventional bank account.177 Their precise reasons for migrating out of 
the traditional banking system varied, but all focused on the costs and 
complexity of bank accounts: several incurred substantial overdraft or 
bounced check fees, one account was closed because of a bankruptcy 
filing, several complained of unexpected fees, and others claimed they 
were the victims of identity theft or unauthorized account access.178 In 
addition, most felt banks mistreated or ignored them in their efforts to 
resolve issues. They felt alienated from and distrustful of the 
mainstream banking system.179 
A March 2012 study by the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve found a general dislike of dealing with banks was the most 
commonly cited reason for being unbanked.180 The Survey of Consumer 
Finances also consistently found that the most common reason 
consumers gave for being unbanked was a dislike of dealing with banks 
(25% of respondents). This response rose from 22.6% of respondents in 
the 2004 survey to 27.8% in the 2010 survey.181 
Other studies also found unbanked customers shared a general 
distrust of banks. A focus group study by the Kansas City Federal 
Reserve Bank of 76 unbanked and underbanked consumers found high 
levels of anger and distrust toward and feelings of disrespect from 
traditional banks.182 Participants in the study especially complained 
about what they experienced as “hidden” fees (such as inactivity fees 
and check order charges) or excessive fees (such as overdraft fees).183 In 
some cases consumers could not cope with the complexity and 
                                                                                                                     
 177. Gordon, Romich, & Waithaka, supra note 38, at 12–13. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 12–14. 
 180. See BD. OF GOVERNORS, supra note 2, at 19. 
 181. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE, 98 FED. RESERVE BULL. NO. 2, CHANGES IN 
U.S. FAMILY FINANCES FROM 2007 TO 2010: EVIDENCE FROM THE SURVEY OF CONSUMER 
FINANCES 32 (2012). 
 182. FED. RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY, A STUDY OF THE UNBANKED & UNDERBANKED 
CONSUMER IN THE TENTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 2, 6 (2010), available at 
http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/research/community/Unbanked.Report.pdf. 
 183. Id. Note that although they considered these fees “hidden,” that is a subjective 
assessment. At least some of the fees may have been unknown at the time, but others simply 
reflect a lack of experience or knowledge about bank accounts. Nevertheless, they were 
necessarily hidden or concealed (such as check order fees). In one case, for example, a 
participant in the focus group reported that he did not realize he needed to keep money in his 
account to use checks; he thought he could use checks as long as he had them in his checkbook. 
Id. at 7. For purposes of the current discussion, however, it is the subjective experience of the 
unbanked and underbanked consumers that matters in understanding their decision-making 
process when determining whether to adopt a bank account. 
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organizational demands of managing a bank account.184 They also said 
that when conflicts arose with the banks over what they believed were 
erroneous charges, they “[did] not feel ‘listened to’ or ‘believed’ 
because of factors such as their lower income, manner of dress or 
language.”185 By contrast, they said that the costs associated with check 
cashing services and money orders were more transparent and 
immediate than those associated with bank accounts. They found access 
to those service providers more convenient than access to banks.186 
Hispanic consumers said they felt especially unwelcome by banks 
because of language barriers, and in some cases Hispanic immigrants 
could not open a bank account or cash a check because they lacked 
adequate identification.187 
Participants in the study also stated that they felt that the costs of 
certain inconveniences might be larger and the benefits of a traditional 
bank account were smaller.188 For example, because underbanked 
consumers live closer to the financial edge, they often feel a need to 
access funds immediately rather than waiting through the two- or three-
day hold period until a check clears at a bank.189 Thus, they put a 
premium on physical control and immediate access to their money.190 
The benefits of a bank account may be lower as well. For example, 
several participants reported they could not use a check to pay their rent 
(their largest bill) but were required to use cash or money order.191 
As a result of the higher costs and feelings of distrust about banks, 
many unbanked customers implicitly or explicitly forego a bank account 
and rely on non-bank alternatives even if they could open a bank 
account. In light of the escalating cost of bank accounts on the one hand 
and the declining costs of prepaid cards on the other, this decision may 
prove rational. Consumers who prefer prepaid cards express several 
reasons for using prepaid cards: prepaid cards impose self-control and 
typically do not permit overdrafting or paying more than they have; 
prepaid cards are less expensive than a checking account; prepaid cards 
give consumers privacy requiring less personal information than a 
checking account; it is much easier to purchase and load a prepaid card 
                                                                                                                     
 184. In one case, for example, a young woman reported that her parents helped her open a 
checking account but she was unable to manage it and ended up closing the account. Id. at 7. 
 185. Id. at 6. 
 186. Id. at 9. For example, many unbanked consumers work hours that make it 
inconvenient to bank during traditional banking hours. The paucity of bank branches in lower 
income areas may make it inconvenient to go to a bank, see id. at 12, especially if one does not 
own a car. See id. at 12. 
 187. Id. at 6. 
 188. Id. at 7. 
 189. Id. at 6, 9. 
 190. Id. at 8. 
 191. Id. 
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than to open a checking account and make deposits; and they can obtain 
a prepaid card without a credit check.192 In addition, some prepaid cards 
offer the ability to save money193 and offer rewards.194 Such features 
reduce the advantages associated with a traditional bank account, debit 
card, or credit card (especially since rewards on debit cards declined 
after the imposition of the Durbin Amendment). 
3.  Self-Control and Budgeting 
Prepaid card users, especially those who experienced difficulty with 
financial management in the past, also state that prepaid cards help them 
control their finances and avoid overdraft fees. The most common 
reason (cited by over half of respondents in one survey) is that prepaid 
cards prevent them from spending more than they have.195 Although 
those who use overdraft protection generally are aware of the cost, there 
are some consumers who overdraft their accounts inadvertently and 
incur unexpected fees.196 Prepaid cards, by contrast, generally do not 
offer overdraft protection or do so only in a limited manner. Prepaid 
card companies will usually decline consumers’ transactions if they do 
not have sufficient funds to cover the purchase. In some instances, 
however, a delay between the initial authorization of a transaction and 
its clearing might lead to an overdraft if other transactions occur in the 
meantime.197 In addition, prepaid cards offer additional services that 
assist consumers in managing their finances, such as providing instant 
                                                                                                                     
 192. I omitted a discussion of why consumers might prefer to use prepaid cards instead of 
checks. Checks are a poor substitute for electronic payments generally, so the more relevant 
comparison is between debit cards and prepaid cards. 
 193. See Gordon, Romich & Waithaka, supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 194. The 1-2-3 REWARDS Card, for example, offers rewards that consumers can redeem 
for gasoline and groceries. See About the Card, 1-2-3 REWARDS: PREPAID, 
http://www.kpfprepaid.com/about-the-card/index.asp (last visited July 22, 2013).   
 195. CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, supra note 161, at 2 (18.3% of underbanked consumers 
preferred prepaid cards to checking accounts); see also BRETTON WOODS, INC., supra note 163, at 4 
(finding that 73% of respondents reported that the aspect they liked most about prepaid cards was that 
prepaid cards prevented them from overspending or overdrafting (citing LINKAGE RESEARCH AND 
CONSULTING, INC., supra note 41, at 2)); NAT’L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, PERSPECTIVES ON PREPAID 
CARDS FROM LOW-INCOME HISPANIC TAX FILERS 3 (2011), available at http://www.nclr.org/images/ 
uploads/publications/perspectives_on_prepaid_cards_ (3).pdf (noting that over 60% of Hispanics and 
over 50% of non-Hispanics reported that one of the things that prepaid card users liked most was that 
they could spend only the amount of money they had); AITE GRP., supra note 169 (finding that 48% of 
debanked consumers stated they “strongly agree” with the statement that prepaid cards are better than a 
checking account because of the inability to overdraft). 
 196. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics and Regulation of Bank Overdraft Protection, 
69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1141, 1174–75 (2012). 
 197. Most prepaid cards do not offer overdraft protection. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, 
supra note 55, at 3. 
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balance updates by text message.198 
4.  Access to Electronic Payments and Other Financial Products 
Another benefit of network branded prepaid cards is that they are 
accepted almost universally and are indistinct in appearance from credit 
and debit cards. They carry the logo of one of the major payment 
networks (Visa, MasterCard, American Express, and Discover), which 
provides a sense of psychological validity for consumers that often feel 
excluded from the financial mainstream.199 A substantial number of 
prepaid card users pointed to the fact that the cards appeared to be 
similar to debit and credit cards as an important feature of prepaid 
cards.200 
Prepaid cards may also offer a vehicle for credit building if 
consumers use them to pay recurring monthly bills and also elect to 
report the payments to a credit reporting agency.201 In fact, celebrity 
financial advisor Suze Orman developed a new prepaid card that touts a 
feature for creating a credit history and improving credit scores.202 
Although this feature appears uncommon for prepaid cards today, 
consumers indicate they want more cards to add this feature.203 
Debit and credit cards also require a credit check before approval, 
and some prepaid card users are not approved for debit or credit card 
products due to bad credit or negative ChexSystems reports of bounced 
checks or closed accounts.204 Thus for those who cannot obtain a debit 
                                                                                                                     
 198. PEW HEALTH GRP., supra note 39, at 3. NetSpend, for example, allows consumers to 
personalize the notifications they receive. See Go Mobile with Anytime Alerts, NETSPEND, 
https://www.netspend.com/why_netspend/powerful_tools/anytime_alerts.shtml (last visited July 
22, 2013). 
 199. See Gordon, Romich, & Waithaka, supra note 38, at 12; BRETTON WOODS, INC., supra 
note 163, at 4; JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 11 fig. 3. 
 200. A survey by the National Urban League found 26% of prepaid card customers 
reported that one of the things they liked best about prepaid cards was that the prepaid cards 
carried the logo of one of the major networks (Visa, MasterCard, American Express, and 
Discover). See BRETTON WOODS, INC., supra note 163, at 4. Javelin’s survey found that nearly 
one-third of prepaid card users said that the ability to carry a major brand that would allow 
ubiquitous acceptance of prepaid cards would lead them to increase their use of prepaid cards. 
JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 7 fig. 3. 
 201. See CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, THE NONPROFIT’S GUIDE TO PREPAID CARDS 14 
(2010), available at http://www.cfsinnovation.com/system/files/CFSI%20Nonprofit%20Guide 
%20to%20 Prepaid. pdf. 
 202. The accuracy of her claim, however, is challenged. See, e.g., Kathy Kristof, Suze 
Orman Card: Rip-Off or Righteous?, CBS NEWS (Jan. 16, 2012, 8:38 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505144_162-57359114/suze-orman-card-rip-off-or-righteous. 
 203. See PEW HEALTH GRP., supra note 39, at 3. 
 204. ChexSystems is a specialized “private database of consumers who have had deposit 
accounts closed while holding a negative balance.” See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 55, at 
35 n.31 (citing Big Brother Is Watching, CONSUMER REPORTS (2009), available at  
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/money/consumer-protection/big-brother-is-watching/overview/ 
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or credit card because of impaired credit, prepaid cards may be the only 
product available for electronic or online payments. 
C.  Prepaid Cards and the Cash Services Economy for the Unbanked 
Many unbanked consumers are unbanked involuntarily.205 
Consumers in lower income areas might not enjoy access to a traditional 
bank because bank branches are scarce in many of these 
neighborhoods.206 As a result, unbanked consumers are more reliant on 
cash payments than banked consumers. According to the FDIC’s 2011 
survey of unbanked households, 23% of unbanked households used 
nonbank providers for products and services such as money orders, 
check cashing, or remittances.207 The survey also found a dramatic 
growth in the use of prepaid cards by unbanked households in recent 
years. Such use rose from 12.2% in 2009 to 17.8% in 2011.208 
Other financial options available to unbanked consumers are mostly 
limited to check cashing and money orders. Although systematic 
empirical research is lacking, it appears as though the costs of check 
cashing services and money orders are comparable to and probably 
higher than the cost for prepaid cards, especially once the total costs in 
terms of time and inconvenience are taken into account.209 According to 
a 2006 report by Consumer Federation of America for example, check 
cashers on average charged 4.11% to cash a payroll check and 2.44% to 
cash a government benefits check.210 Participants in the study by 
Gordon, Romich, and Waithaka reported paying as much as $13 per 
                                                                                                                     
index. htm). 
 205. For example, 60% of prepaid card users in the Aite Group study expressed a 
preference for using checking accounts rather than prepaid cards, which suggests that prepaid 
card users are unbanked involuntarily rather than by choice. See AUFSEESER, supra note 43, at 6. 
 206. See DEYANIRA DEL RIO, NEIGHBORHOOD ECON. DEV. ADVOCACY PROJECT, PREPAID 
CARDS & FINANCIAL SERVICES IN LOW INCOME COMMUNITIES (2011), available at 
www.fdic.gov/about/comein/DelRioDec11.pdf.  
 207. FDIC, 2011 SURVEY, supra note 3, at 6. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See SUZANNE MARTINDALE & MICHAEL MCCAULEY, ADDING IT ALL UP: HOW PREPAID 
CARD FEES COMPARE TO CHECKING ACCOUNT FEES (Apr. 2011), available at 
http://www.defendyourdollars.org/pdf/Adding-It-All-Up.pdf. 
 210. JEAN ANN FOX & PATRICK WOODALL, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., CASHED OUT: 
CONSUMERS PAY STEEP PREMIUM TO “BANK” AT CHECK CASHING OUTLETS 1–2 (2006), available 
at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/CFA_2006_Check_Cashing_Study111506.pdf. The 
Consumer Federation of America study is the most recent systematic study of check cashing 
fees that I located. Nevertheless, those figures appear to be more or less valid today. According 
to the website of United Check Cashing the fees range from 1.5% to 5% depending on the state. 
See FAQ, UNITED CHECK CASHING, http://www.unitedcheckcashing.com/FAQ.asp (last visited 
July 22, 2013). Walmart charges less for both check-cashing services ($3 to $6 per check 
cashed) and for prepaid cards (issued for free). Walmart MoneyCenter: Check Cashing, 
WALMART, http://www.walmart.com/cp/Check-Cashing/632047 (last visited July 22, 2013).   
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check, or $40 to $60 per month, to cash checks.211 Another study 
estimated that consumers who use check cashers pay $140 to $720 per 
year in fees.212 A recent study by the Bretton Woods economic 
consulting group estimates that consumers who switch from cash to 
reloadable prepaid cards can save an average of 56% per month by 
avoiding check cashing, money orders, and other fees.213 Twenty-seven 
percent of respondents to the National Urban League survey stated that 
one of the things they liked most about prepaid cards was that using a 
prepaid card was cheaper than using a check casher.214 Moreover, 
because none of these studies account for the time, inconvenience, and 
risk of acquiring cash, these estimates surely underestimate the full 
costs of relying on cash. 
Cash and money orders offer limited functionality and flexibility for 
online shopping and electronic transactions.215 Additionally, consumers 
who use check cashers and money orders incur additional transaction 
costs, such as the “shoe leather” costs of going from place to place. 
Gordon, Romich, and Waithaka’s study participants commented that 
“the card keeps them from having to run multiple places to cash a 
check, buy money orders, and then deliver payments.”216 Prepaid card 
users find this convenience especially valuable for recurrent and 
predictable financial obligations, such as rent. Moreover, using direct 
deposit can further increase the convenience of prepaid cards relative to 
cash alternatives by making money available immediately. Paying a bill 
by using a check casher or money order typically incurs a delay in 
posting time of 24 to 72 hours as compared to immediate payment by 
prepaid card. Consumers can also load prepaid cards conveniently; 
according to one study, almost half of all prepaid cardholders used the 
most popular method to reload—online.217 
Because carrying cash can be dangerous and can raise the risks of 
crime and loss, consumers tend to use electronic payments more 
                                                                                                                     
 211. Gordon, Romich & Waithaka, supra note 38, at 10, 14. 
 212. BRETTON WOODS, INC., supra note 20, at 13 (citing study by Chexar Networks, Inc.). 
 213. Press Release, Network Branded Prepaid Card Association, Reloadable Prepaid Cards 
Are Low-Cost Options Compared to Other Financial Tools According to Annual Bretton Woods 
Analysis (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.nbpca.org/~/media/680D717219DB40209EE0CAC1EF 
6D3079.ashx (citing BRETTON WOODS INC, supra note 163). 
 214. See BRETTON WOODS, INC., supra note 163, at 4. 
 215. Although it is technically possible to shop online using a money order, many major sites 
such as Amazon.com do not accept checks or money orders and where money orders are accepted, the 
process is highly cumbersome and time consuming. See Help: Payment Methods, AMAZON.COM, 
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/ customer/display.html/ref=hp_513058_lppaymethmore?nodeId 
=201132710 (last visited July 22, 2013).  
 216. Gordon, Romich & Waithaka, supra note 38, at 12; see also FED. RESERVE BANK OF 
KAN. CITY, supra note 182, at 9 (describing routines used by unbanked consumers to pay bills 
and organize their finances). 
 217. JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 29. 
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frequently in high-crime areas.218 The National Urban League survey 
found that the second-most common reason for using prepaid cards, 
stated by 41% of respondents, is that prepaid cards are safer and easier 
to use than carrying cash.219 Over 40% of those in a National Council of 
La Raza study also stated that one of the things they liked most about 
prepaid cards was not having to carry cash.220 Survey respondents also 
indicated that using prepaid cards (like other types of electronic 
payments) instead of cash can make it easier to budget and manage 
money by creating a transaction history.221 
Most fundamental, it is exceedingly difficult to function in the 
American economy today without payment cards of some sort. 
Activities such as e-commerce, car rentals, and travel all require access 
to payment cards. According to the Javelin Strategy and Research study, 
56% of unbanked consumers who own prepaid cards use them regularly 
for online transactions, compared to 46% of all prepaid card 
customers.222 Prepaid cards thus serve an important role for unbanked 
and underbanked consumers. According to a 2009 survey of 400 
underbanked prepaid card users by the Center for Financial Services 
Innovation and the Network Branded Prepaid Card Association, 78% of 
respondents said that their cards were very or extremely useful, 74% 
said they were very likely or certain to recommend the card to others, 
60% used their cards weekly, and 12% used them daily.223 
IV.  MARKET FAILURE AND REGULATORY RESPONSES 
For many consumers, prepaid cards are less expensive and more 
functional than other payment alternatives. Their decision to use prepaid 
cards is rational and consistent with standard economic analysis. 
Nevertheless, some express concern that prepaid cards are unduly 
expensive for consumers, especially low-income, less educated, and less 
financially experienced consumers. They fear that these consumers may 
pay excessively for prepaid cards compared to alternatives. Such 
                                                                                                                     
 218. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees and the 
Limits of Regulation, 2012 INT’L CENTER FOR L. & ECON. 17 n.57, available at 
http://www.laweconcenter.org/images/articles/zywicki_interchange.pdf (ICLE Financial 
Regulatory Program White Paper Series). 
 219. See BRETTON WOODS, INC., supra note 163, at 4. This does not imply that the other 
73% thought check cashers were less expensive, just that prepaid card customers chose to use 
prepaid cards for reasons other than cost (such as convenience). See id. 
 220. NAT’L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, supra note 195, at 3. 
 221. See BRETTON WOODS, INC., supra note 163, at 4; NAT’L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, supra 
note 195, at 3. 
 222. JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 6. 
 223. CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, RESULTS OF THE NBPCA/CFSI SURVEY: SATISFACTION 
WITH AND USAGE OF PREPAID CARDS 1, 3 (2009), available at http://cfsinnovation.com/system/files/ 
imported/managed_documents/nbpca_cfsi_final_3_.pdf. 
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criticisms produced calls for regulation of the terms and marketing of 
prepaid cards. Two rationales support regulatory intervention. First, a 
market failure may result from inadequate competition that produces 
higher prices and a monopoly power in the market. Second, some argue 
that there is a consumer protection problem—that consumers lack 
sufficient knowledge or capability to understand the complexity of the 
product and the fees associated with it. Either way, some argue that 
prepaid cards harm consumers with higher prices and lower quality.224 
Economic theory and available evidence to date, however, fail to 
support either of these rationales for regulatory intervention. Nor is 
there any reason to believe that legislators could fashion government 
regulation in such a manner to improve market outcomes. On the other 
hand, although there is little basis for remedial intervention in the name 
of competition or consumer protection, legislators might consider more 
modest market-reinforcing interventions that could proactively promote 
future competition and consumer protection rather than displace it with 
regulation. 
A.  Competitive Failure? 
The first potential rationale for regulation is the existence of a 
competitive failure that intervention could remedy. But the prepaid card 
market appears exceedingly competitive and barriers to entry are low. 
New cards enter the market frequently, including cards provided by 
traditional financial service providers such as American Express and 
major banks, celebrity-branded cards, and cards aimed at particular 
demographic groups.225 A company need not be a bank in order to enter 
the prepaid card market because prepaid cards are marketed to 
consumers through program officers. The program officers serve as the 
“front man” branding the cards and offering much of the day-to-day 
operational support for cards while partnering with a network and bank 
processor in the back office. For example, the two largest prepaid card 
providers—NetSpend and Green Dot—were not banks when they 
attained their leadership positions in the market.226 Barriers to entry in 
the banking industry, by contrast, are high. 
There are other indicators of thriving competition in the prepaid card 
industry. Many of the new cards feature low and simplified fee 
                                                                                                                     
 224. See supra notes 54–75 and accompanying text. 
 225. See Andrew R. Johnson, Flood of Competition Weighs on Prepaid-Card Companies, 
FOX BUSINESS, July 27, 2010, http://markets.m.foxbusiness.com/quickPage.html?page=32642& 
content=77126749&pageNum=-1; Susan Johnston, The Pitfalls of Celebrity-Branded Cards, 
MINT.COM (Jan. 3, 2011) http://www.mint.com/blog/trends/celebrity-prepaid-cards-01032011.  
 226. Green Dot subsequently did acquire a bank but it was not necessary to conduct its 
business. Green Dot Buying Small Utah Bank, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 23, 2011, 
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9R6MI0G0.htm. 
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structures and the number of fees is steadily declining over time.227 
Especially for lower income consumers, the total price of holding and 
using prepaid cards fell in recent years even as the cost of traditional 
bank accounts trended up.228 The quality of prepaid cards also rose as 
prices fell in the wake of heightened competition.229 Prepaid cards now 
include new features such as linked savings accounts; web, text, and 
email alerts; electronic statements; and mobile banking.230 
Striking features of the prepaid card industry are the ease by which 
consumers can switch cards and the fierce competitive efforts 
companies exert to attract new customers. Switching debit cards usually 
entails switching bank accounts, which can prove a difficult and tedious 
process, especially for lower income consumers who may suffer from 
blemished financial records. Switching credit cards can also prove 
difficult for those with impaired credit because they may not receive 
approval for a new credit card. Prepaid cards, by contrast, generally 
require no credit check, and feature minimal transaction costs when 
switching from one prepaid card to another. Indeed, a consumer can 
even transfer funds easily from one prepaid card to a new one 
electronically. 
Data from the Federal Reserve also indicate the ease with which 
consumers can switch prepaid cards compared to alternatives.231 For 
example, in 2009 only 9% of consumers discarded one or more of their 
debit cards and 16.5% discarded one or more credit card.232 By contrast, 
29% of consumers discarded at least one prepaid card.233 There is little 
reason to believe that there is a competitive market failure in the prepaid 
card market given the ease with which consumers can switch loyalties 
and obtain new prepaid cards, the rivalry from other forms of electronic 
payments such as debit and credit cards, and the ease of entry and 
strong competition to attract new customers. As noted, in contrast to the 
media’s and regulators’ criticism of prepaid cards, prepaid card 
customers generally express high levels of satisfaction with their cards 
                                                                                                                     
 227. See discussion supra notes 56–70 and accompanying text. 
 228. BRETTON WOODS, INC., supra note 163, at 10; see PHILIP KEITEL, FED. RESERVE BANK OF 
PHILA., FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE PREPAID CARD INDUSTRY: COSTS, BENEFITS, AND CHANGING 
INDUSTRY DYNAMICS 18–19 (2010), available at http://www.philadelphia fed.org/consumer-credit-and-
payments/payment-cards-center/events/conferences/2011/C2011-Federal-Regulation-of-Prepaid-Card-
Industry.pdf (conference summary describing comments of Green Dot’s Steve Streit and MetaBank’s 
Brad Hanson). 
 229. See KEITEL, supra note 228, at 18. 
 230. See Go Mobile with Anytime Alerts, supra note 198; Out of 82 Prepaid Debit Cards, 
Find the One for You, supra note 107. 
 231. See Foster et al., supra note 24, at 45–46. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
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that are consistent with the hypothesis that the market is competitive.234 
Moreover, although issuer revenues have grown as the market has 
grown, there is no evidence that prepaid card issuers are earning 
sustainable economic profits or “rents” from their operations. In fact, 
despite growing revenues, the stocks of the industry’s largest players 
(NetSpend and Green Dot) sagged as a result of heightened entry and 
competition.235 
B.  Consumer Protection Rationales: Do Prepaid Card Users 
Understand What They Are Doing? 
A market failure might support government intervention if 
consumers either lack an accurate understanding of the full cost of 
prepaid cards (compared to relevant alternatives) or are unable to easily 
compare offers from competing prepaid card issuers. In such a case, 
regulators could justify intervention if they reduced fees or required the 
disclosure of certain terms or fees.236 
Based on available information, however, prepaid card customers 
appear to have an accurate sense of the cards’ cost. Indeed, the fee 
structure of prepaid cards does not seem any more complicated than 
those for credit cards or checking accounts. And, as noted, many 
consumers who use prepaid cards do so precisely because these cards 
are less complicated than the myriad fees and rules associated with 
checking accounts or credit cards. Almost three-quarters of prepaid card 
users in a 2009 survey said the fees for using their cards were fair, and 
an even greater number said they understood the fees well.237 Interviews 
by Gordon, Romich, and Waithaka revealed that consumers found the 
fee structures of prepaid cards transparent and easy to understand, that 
they had knowledge of the fees for their transactions, and that there 
were not unexpected fees.238 They also thought the fees charged were 
fair.239 This sentiment is echoed anecdotally in the Pew Focus Group 
study, as one participant commented: 
I think [prepaid card fees] are fair because they’re upfront. 
I’m thinking in contrast to a checking account . . . [where] 
they’re going to whammy you with fees on the backside. 
Whereas [with] prepaid debit cards, they’re very upfront. 
                                                                                                                     
 234. See discussion supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
 235. See Johnson, supra note 225. In fact, to the extent that any barrier to entry exists, the 
barrier is one of the perverse effects of the Durbin Amendment that chilled entry into the market 
by larger banks. See discussion infra Section IV.C. 
 236. This assumes, of course, that any such intervention is well-tailored to address and 
correct the identified problem. 
 237. CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, supra note 195, at 5. 
 238. Gordon, Romich & Waithaka, supra note 38, at 13. 
 239. Id. at 14. 
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This is the cost of the card; this is the cost for the services. 
It’s up to you at that point.240 
Moreover, consumers who use prepaid cards state that they 
understand the kind and amount of fees on prepaid cards better than 
they do for debit or credit cards.241 Indeed, despite the various fees on 
prepaid cards, the number of potential fees on checking accounts and 
credit cards is even larger.242 Consumers’ confusion and lack of 
comprehension about the terms and fees of bank accounts is what led 
many of them to reject the traditional banking system in favor of the 
simpler and more transparent pricing scheme of prepaid cards.243 
Prepaid card users also appear to have an accurate sense of which fee 
combinations are most suitable for their particular situations. NetSpend, 
for example, offers two different payment plans: one with a monthly fee 
and free POS transactions (plus a few other à la carte fees) and another 
plan that charges no monthly fee but charges a per-transaction fee 
instead.244 Seventy-four percent of NetSpend’s customers choose the 
per-transaction plan rather than the monthly-fee plan.245 According to 
data provided to the author by NetSpend, its customers overwhelmingly 
choose the correct card and adjust their choices over time to correct any 
errors. Seventy-four percent of NetSpend’s customers choose the least-
expensive fee plan for their card usage.246 Five percent pay monthly but 
do not use the card frequently enough to justify the flat fee, and 21% 
pay on a per-transaction basis but use the card enough to warrant 
selecting the monthly fee plan.247 Users select a card plan at the time of 
activation, but about 11% switch from one plan to another during their 
tenure. In addition, NetSpend says that it has a proactive outreach 
program to inform customers of less expensive options.248 Thus, an 
overwhelming number choose the right plan for their usage patterns and 
can easily switch to another plan or another card issuer if they make 
                                                                                                                     
 240. PEW HEALTH GRP., supra note 39, at 1. 
 241. See supra notes 238–40 and accompanying text.  
 242. PEW HEALTH GRP., supra note 39, at 1. 
 243. See Gordon, Romich & Waithaka, supra note 38, at 13. 
 244. E-mail from Lisa Henken, Netspend, to Todd J. Zywicki, Professor of Law, George 
Mason Univ. Sch. of Law (Apr. 17, 2012, 11:33 PM EST) (on file with author).  
 245. E-mail from Lisa Henken, Netspend, to Todd J. Zywicki, Professor of Law, George 
Mason Univ. Sch. of Law (Apr. 30, 2012, 4:18 PM EST) (on file with author).  
 246. E-mail from Lisa Henken, supra note 244. 
 247. Id. Note that the asymmetric distribution of errors toward the no monthly fee card 
could result from a variety of sources: an underestimation of the expected frequency of card 
usage, liquidity constraints that might make the monthly fee more burdensome for some 
customers, or an endogeneity effect where consumers who elect the monthly fee card then 
proceed to use it more. 
 248. Id. By phone and through the website and when a customer calls in with a customer 
service question, the representative can review the customer’s account and suggest changes. 
40
Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 5 [2013], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss5/2
2013] THE ECONOMICS AND REGULATION OF NETWORK BRANDED PREPAID CARDS 1517 
 
mistakes. As a result, if regulation foreclosed options for consumers—
such as the proposed Menendez legislation (described in Part II) that 
would prohibit cards with per-transaction fee pricing—hundreds of 
thousands would pay higher fees or possibly abandon prepaid cards 
completely. 
C.  Market-Reinforcing Regulation 
Although advocates of intervention abstractly criticize prepaid cards 
and allege that consumers do not understand the cost and fee structure 
of prepaid cards, or that the price of prepaid cards is simply “too high” 
in some absolute sense, they provide no tangible evidence that this is 
actually the case. Thus, even while deep regulatory intervention is 
unwarranted, regulators should consider milder, market-reinforcing 
regulation that promotes more robust competition and consumer choice 
in the market. 
In fact, the biggest single obstacle to increased competition and 
consumer welfare today is not any failure of competition, but rather the 
Durbin Amendment. And the single most effective step that could 
benefit consumers and promote market competition is to repeal the 
Durbin Amendment, allow market forces to set interchange fees, and 
allow debit and prepaid cards to compete on a level playing field. Large 
banks have the potential to place tremendous competitive pressure on 
incumbents in the prepaid card industry through the particular mix of 
low card fees and features that they can provide (such as branches and 
in-network ATMs). In addition, large banks appear uniquely positioned 
to develop prepaid cards that function either as alternatives to bank 
accounts or as bridges from prepaid cards to bank accounts and other 
traditional banking services. The Durbin Amendment chills this 
competitive pressure by forcing large banks to choose between either 
offering cards with reduced functionality and features or exposing their 
cards to the Durbin Amendment’s interchange fee price controls (which, 
if applicable, would force large issuers to raise other fees or reduce 
services).249 This arbitrary restraint on competition is harmful to 
consumers. 
Another area where government intervention may be appropriate 
relates to the pass-through of FDIC insurance on customer account 
balances in the event the prepaid card issuer fails.250 Most prepaid cards 
are issued by a program manager (such as NetSpend) that collects the 
customer’s money and then, for administrative purposes, deposits the 
money in a pooled account. The account is held in the name of the 
                                                                                                                     
 249. See supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text. 
 250. For a brief explanation, see Prepaid Cards & Deposit Insurance, NETWORK BRANDED 
PREPAID CARD ASSOCIATION, http://www.nbpca.com/en/Government-Affairs/Policy-Positions/Deposit-
Insurance. aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2013). 
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program manager. Once the funds are pooled, the total amount in the 
program manager’s account easily exceeds the $250,000 limit for FDIC 
insurance.251 In theory, this arrangement could provide insecurity for 
customers’ funds. In practice, however, the FDIC issues guidance to 
banks on how to preserve FDIC pass-through insurance on individual 
cardholders’ accounts.252 Thus, it appears that every prepaid card 
backed by a bank—which apparently includes every major prepaid card 
in the market today except for those issued by American Express253—
provides FDIC pass-through insurance for its customers.254 According 
to the Pew Study, more than 90% of the prepaid card programs in the 
study offered FDIC deposit insurance pass-through.255 Most consumers 
believed that their deposits were insured.256 In practice, the lack of 
FDIC pass-through appears more of a theoretical problem than a real 
problem. This suggests that both the benefits and costs of mandating 
FDIC pass-through are likely small. 
Some uncertainty also exists about consumer protection from fraud 
or unauthorized use of prepaid cards. Fraud protection for prepaid cards 
is not required by the Electronic Funds Transfer Act. The CFPB issued 
an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the question of whether 
to extend Regulation E to prepaid cards.257 Nevertheless, all of the 
prepaid cards Pew studied offered some type of contractual protection 
                                                                                                                     
 251. Id.  
 252. See Insurability of Funds Underlying Stored Value Cards and Other Nontraditional 
Access Mechanisms, 73 Fed. Reg. 67155, 67156 (Nov. 13, 2008) (describing the process for 
providing deposit insurance for prepaid cards).  
 253. American Express cards are not FDIC insured because American Express is not a bank 
and pools its customers’ accounts rather than segregating them. See More about the Amex Prepaid 
Card, BANKTALK (June 24, 2011), http://banktalk.org/2011/06/24/more-about-the-amex-prepaid-
card. The funds on American Express cards are protected by state transmitter laws. See CONSUMER 
ACTION, PREPAID CREDIT CARD SURVEY: 2012, at 15 (2012), available at http://www.consumer-
action.org/ downloads/press/2012_Prepaid_Card_Survey.pdf; Money Services Business Disclosures,  
AMERICAN EXPRESS, https://www.americanexpress.com/us/content/prepaid/state-licensing.  
html?vgnextchannel=95ddb81e8482a110VgnVCM100000defaad94RCRD&appinstancename=defa
ult (last visited July 22, 2013). 
 254. See CONSUMER ACTION, supra note 253, at 3–4. The universality of providing FDIC 
pass-through insurance is driven in part by a requirement that any bank that provides clearance 
services for federal government benefit cards must comply with FDIC regulations in order to 
offer FDIC pass-through insurance. See Federal Government Participation in the Automated 
Clearing House, 31 C.F.R. § 210 (2010), available at http://www.fms.treas.gov/ach/31cfr210_i 
nt_final.pdf. Once established, the same mechanisms used for federal government programs 
apply to private prepaid cards as well. 
 255. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 55, at 4. Only 3 of 52 card programs expressly 
stated that they did not offer FDIC pass-through, 23 claimed to offer pass-through, and 26 
featured disclosures. Id. at 10. 
 256. Id. at 4, 10. 
 257. Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 77 Fed. Reg. 30,923 (proposed May 24, 
2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1005). 
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for unauthorized transfers.258 Pew claims these contractual protections 
generally are not as “favorable as the protections that are guaranteed to 
checking account holders by EFTA” and are contractual provisions 
subject to revision at any time.259 In practice, however, issuing networks 
offer fraud protection on prepaid cards similar to that offered on debit 
cards. As one commentator observed, “Although issuing banks are not 
mandated to offer this protection on prepaid cards, competition in the 
industry has led to many prepaid cards with liability protection.”260 
Thus, again, both the benefits and costs of extending Regulation E 
protection to prepaid cards are relatively small. On the other hand, 
certain features of Regulation E, such as the period of time during 
which a bank can hold a suspicious charge and the requirement that 
banks issue periodic statements to customers, may not suit prepaid cards 
due to the heightened potential for fraud. Also, the “transient” nature of 
prepaid card customers makes recovery difficult in the event that an 
issuer later wins a dispute over a charge.261 
Some also propose that the industry adopt a standardized format for 
disclosure of prepaid card fees modeled after the “Schumer box” for 
credit cards.262 Pew’s analysis found that card fee disclosure was often 
incomplete and it was often difficult to ascertain whether a card had a 
certain fee.263 Although most prepaid card customers state that they 
understand their card fees, the National Urban League found that 24% 
of survey respondents did not understand all of the card fees when they 
acquired their cards and that 23% claimed they were charged an 
unexpected fee. This pattern suggests room for improving disclosures to 
assist consumer understanding and comparison shopping.264 These 
remaining problems may prove self-correcting as a result of the trend 
                                                                                                                     
 258. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 55, at 20. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Douglas A. King, Dispelling Prepaid Card Myths: Not All Cards Are Created Equal, 
FED. RESERVE BANK ATLANTA (July 5, 2011), http://portalsandrails.frbatlanta.org/2011/ 
07/dispelling-prepaid-card-myths-not-all-cards-created-equal.html. 
 261. For discussion, see Letter from Mary Mitchell Dunn, Senior Vice President and 
Deputy General Counsel, Credit Union Nat’l Ass’n, to Monica Jackson, Office of the Executive 
Secretary, Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau (July 23, 2012), available at http://www.cuna.org/ 
download/cl_072312.pdf (regarding the notice of proposed rulemaking for electronic fund 
transfers). 
 262. See DAVID NEWVILLE, CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, THINKING INSIDE THE BOX: 
IMPROVING CONSUMER OUTCOMES THROUGH BETTER FEE DISCLOSURE FOR PREPAID CARDS 4, 7 
(2012), available at http://cfsinnovation.com/system/files/CFSI_Prepaid%20Cards%20White 
paper%20FInal_0.pdf. 
 263. For example, Pew found that 30 cards disclosed a fee to speak to a live customer 
service representative, 11 disclosed it as free, and 11 cards did not disclose whether there was a 
fee to speak to a customer service representative. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 55, 
at 3. 
 264. See LINKAGE RESEARCH CONSULTING, INC., supra note 41, at 2. 
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toward eliminating fees and as a result of consumers gaining experience 
with the product. 
A standardized disclosure format could prove useful to consumers 
and to the competitive process because it would enable consumers to 
easily find the card that is most appropriate for their purposes. 
Regulators must ensure that the information is provided in a user-
friendly way and that the fees that require disclosure in the standardized 
format are relevant to consumers. Regulators should also subject 
disclosures to periodic review and updates in light of product 
innovations and changing consumer preferences. In addition, regulators 
should copy test any mandated disclosures and ensure they improve 
consumer comprehension and decision making. 
CONCLUSION 
Network branded prepaid cards have emerged as an important and 
rapidly growing sector of the retail consumer banking system. The 
regulatory onslaught of the past several years increased demand for 
prepaid cards as regulation raised the costs of and reduced access to 
debit and credit cards especially among lower income and younger 
consumers. At the same time, the need for access to electronic payments 
increased. 
Prepaid cards crept toward the mainstream of the consumer 
payments market, and now spur greater competition and produce higher 
quality and lower cost for customers—a dramatic contrast from the 
rising price of traditional bank accounts. Although prepaid cards may 
seem expensive, those who use them appear to do so rationally. To date, 
scholars and regulators cannot identify a cognizable market failure or 
failure of consumer protection that justifies remedial governmental 
intervention. 
Given the regulatory havoc wreaked on the debit and credit card 
systems during the past several years, prepaid cards are increasingly 
becoming a final resort for many consumers who are unable to gain 
other access to the functionality of electronic payments. In light of this 
reality, regulators should move exceedingly cautiously before taking 
steps that could critically harm the dynamic and evolving prepaid card 
market that provides value and choice to millions of Americans. 
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